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This thesis describes and evaluates the manpower demand forecasting system
used by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (XAVFAC) both to obtain
manpower resources for its facilities acquisition mission during the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting process and to allocate these resources among its
Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs). The method by which NAVFAC developed its
manpower demand forecasting is assessed as being valid. This thesis shows that the
accuracy of this model, developed in 1980 using FY 79 data, can be enhanced by using
more recent data over a period of several fiscal years. This is done in this thesis using
FY S5 and FY 86 data. Thesis research showed that this same model can be used as a
baseline with a high degree of accuracy to allocate resources among the EFDs;
however, an expanded data base is crucial to improved accuracy. Other manpower
staffing factors, not quantified in NAVFAC's staffing model, are described and their
effects on staffing requirements appraised. The means by which EFDs internally
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I. INTRODUCTION
How many people will we need? This is one of the most perplexing questions
faced by a manager, or an organization, because it is so difficult to answer and so
much is at stake. For the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) and its
six subordinate Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs), which are charged with designing
and administering more than S6 billion in construction work, per year, as well as
managing and maintaining nearly five million acres of Navy and Marine Corps real
estate with a facilities inventory- worth more than SI 00 billion, 1 this is a particularly
vital question. Consider that most managers have difficulty determining personnel
needs for their own departments, magnify this by at least four major departments in an
EFD, each department with stalls ranging from 50-400 people, project this through the
six EFDs of NAVFAC, add a dozen or so stalling "factors" to complicate matters, and
it is seen why manpower planning staffing is one of the most important and complex
tasks confronting NAVFAC management.
With overstaffing. costs are excessive, people are not fully utilized, and
productivity suffers. And when government organizations operate under austerely
limited personnel ceilings, overstaffing in one department or organization means that
fewer personnel resources are available to other departments organizations.
Understating leads to consequences just as bad, according to a study done for the
Army Corps of Engineers by the Logistics Management Institute:
It is apparent from historical information that greater desien and
construction workload is being performed than in the past and with fewer
manpower resources. The historic USACE (U.S. Armv Corps of Engineers) level
of resource requirements for providing design and construction" services is
comparable to that of other public and" private sector design and construction
agents. Our previous studies on DoD construction and management costs lead us
to believe that increasing the ratio of workload to manpower has resulted in
increased costs in terms of customer dissatisfaction, failure of the facility to meet
the need for which it was built, and increased change orders. [Ref. 1: p. "4]
It is apparent that understaffing leads to missed opportunities. Because of hiring
and other personnel-action constraints, an EFD's work force cannot be added to or cut
on short notice, or in some instances at all. without incurring substantial costs, in
Source: NAVFAC Code 05
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terms of both money and productivity. Thus, manpower planning stalling is one of the
keys to holding down personnel costs and stimulating productivity. With so much at
stake one would think that, given the level of sophistication in management science,
manpower staffing would be as exact a process as. say, forecasting the weather. Of
course, forecasting the weather is not an exact science. Richard Fantzreb sums it up:
But why has there been so little success in making human resource
planning work? Primarily because it has proved to be quite difficult to forecast an
organization s need lor people. Is this a surprising statement? How manv
organizations can sav with confidence whether thev are overstaffed, understaffed,
or properly stalled at a given moment in time? [Re'f. 2: p. 859]
This thesis takes a practical look at the subject of manpower requirements
forecasting. It explores the logic of the process, reviews the techniques, surveys some of
the obstacles encountered in practice, points the way to sources of further information
for the EFDs, and makes recommendations for improvements to current methods
employed.
A. SCOPE OF THESIS
Although this research is primarily of interest to senior managers in the
NAVFAC organization, the research analyses, recommendations, and conclusions can
easily be adapted by the manager of any organization who is interested in determining
manpower requirements. This thesis thus includes brief explanations of NAVFAC's
organization and programs to aid the understanding of the uninitiated.
This thesis addresses the topic of "demand forecasting," which essentially answers
the question: "How7 many people do we need?" Not addressed is a related question in
personnel resource management: "How many people will we need to hire (or train)?"
This latter aspect involves developing a detailed summary of each employee's skills and
training background, construction of Replacement Charts which detail who will replace
whom in the event of a job opening, and development of Replacement Summaries which
supplement Replacement Charts and list likely replacements and their relative strengths
and weaknesses for each job [Ref. 3: p. 120]. Investigating the hiring and training
system at NAVFAC was considered beyond the scope of this thesis.
The first question, "How many people do we need?", for the EFDs, is determined
by future workload, technology, productivity, contracting regulations, and a variety of
other factors.
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The second question can be approached only after the first is answered, and only
after it has been determined how may present employees will be available at some
future time to meet staffing needs. Finding out how many employees will be available
in various skill categories after allowing for turnover, retirement, promotion, etc., is
often called "supply forecasting." Determining the total number of employees required
is then called "demand forecasting." The first question is answered by a demand
forecast. The second question is answered by subtracting the supply forecast from the
demand forecast. [Ref. 2: p. 850]
The scope of this thesis is also narrowed to studying demand forecasting and
resource allocations for NAVFAC's EFD Facility Acquisition Mission, 2 which is
embodied in Program IV and the Facility Support Contracting portion of Program IX,
which together comprise approximately 65% of EFD staffing. Program IX staffing in
this thesis refers only to Code 02 (Contracts) and Code 05 (Construction). The
following is a brief explanation of NAVFAC's management by Programs, taken from
the fiscal year 19S6 NAVFAC Operating Plan:
One of the basic precepts of the Command is that we staff through an
organizational structure and we execute our mission and resources through a
program structure. The organizations at Headquarters and the various Tield
activities are broken down into work centers (departments, divisions, branches,
sections, etc.). through which we gather together stalls of specific expertise and
provide for personnel management. Through a properlv staffed organizational
structure, we attempt to have available the" trained work force, in the tvpes of
field activities and in the required geographical areas, to provide the Various
products and services of our Command mission. [Ref. 4: p. 12]
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict the NAVFAC HQ organization and a "typical" EFD
organization. EFDs carry out their mission in terms of seven Programs [Ref. 4: pp.
21-47]:
• Program I1-- Planning and Real Estate. Formulates plans for land and facilities,
acquires, leases and disposes of real property, and manages natural resources.
• Program III - Engineering and Design. Vlanages the design of facilities, applies
high" technology to improve desigrTquality and productivity, develops design
and construction criteria, and provides engineering consultation.
• Program IV - Construction. Manages world-wide construction of facilities for
the Navy, Marine Corps, and other TJ.S. government organizations.
• Program VI - Seabees. Supports the active and reserve Naval Construction
Force.
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Figure 1.2 EFD Organization
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• Program VIII - Family Housing. Operates and maintains family housing for the
Navy.
• Program IX - Facilities Management. Oversees the total Naw public works
program.
• Program X - Administration. Provides corporate direction and administrative
support for the organization.
It was decided early in the research process to limit the thesis to Programs IV
and IX because of the complexity of the manpower budgeting process for the other
Programs, as well as the large proportion of an EFD's total stalling comprised by
Programs IV and IX. In terms of organizational structure. Programs IV and IX
encompass more than 80% of the manpower resources in an EFD's Acquisition
Organization consisting of the Acquisition Project Management Office (Code 09A2 or
50), Contract Division (Code 02), Engineering and Design Division (Code 04).
Acquisition Support Office (Code 09A1), and Construction Division (Code 05), and a
smattering of resources from other Divisions (less than 5% of the resources of the
previous five Divisions).
The scope of this research primarily concerns the EFDs with CONUS
responsibilities. Because of the wide geographical dispersion of the activities served by
the Atlantic and Pacific EFDs and the additional complexity of doing business overseas
(or, in some cases, the simplicity of doing business overseas), these two EFDs are
organized differently from the EFDs with only CONUS responsibilities. This is not to
say that manpower staffing is any less important at Atlantic Division and Pacific
Division; however, the operating parameters at these EFDs are slightly different from
the others. Statistical comparisons will primarily be directed at the EFDs with CONUS
responsibilities.
Lastly, this research deals only with civilian personnel requirements. The
requirement for military personnel resources is addressed in an entirely different
manner by NAVFAC and is beyond the scope of this thesis.
B. THE PROBLEM
How many people will we need?
For the mission of facilities acquisition the EFDs of NAVFAC have nearly
doubled their primary work output of construction dollars work-in-place (WIP) from
S1.7B (constant FY 82 S) in FY 76 to a projected S3.2B (constant FY 82 S) in FY S7 3
(the term work-in-place is described further in the paragraphs following). Construction
3 Source: NAVFAC Code 05.
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design technology has changed during this ten year period. Contract administration
procedures have changed. NAVFAC goals have changed. The organizational structure
of the EFDs has changed. In fact, just about everything an EFD does in the way of
facility acquisition has changed during this ten-year period (and in the ten years before
this), and significantly so.
So, how many people do NAVFAC and its EFDs need to do their job?
This thesis was born, in part, out of a desire to answer that question. Research
on this topic was actually initiated from a request to explain the statistical anomaly
shown in Table 1:
TABLE 1













tot 870 545 1. 60
Western
Division
754 568 1. 33
Source: WESTDIV C omptroller
Work-in-Place (WIP), measured in dollars, is the culmination of the facilities
acquisition process-the actual construction of a facility--and is the primary output of
Programs IV & IX. WIP is defined as that amount of construction work (in dollars)
done by a contractor with costs subsequently billed to the Navy. For example, a
contractor is building a hospital for the Navy. The contractor has bid S20 million to
build the hospital and the Navy has accepted his bid. At the end of the first month
(say September, the last month in the fiscal year) the contractor sends a bill to the
Navy for SI million, thus indicating he has completed SI million worth of work, or
1,20th of the project. The Navy pays him the SI million, thus indicating agreement
that the contractor has performed that amount of work. Thus, the contractor has
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performed SI million worth of WIP, and the EFD under whose cognizance the hospital
falls adds that SI million worth of WIP to their fiscal year total.
Work-years are the total labor hours charged to a job or cost account divided by
the total number of productive labor hours for a person in a year, 1741. One work-year
is equivalent to one person working for one year.
Table 1 reflects that WESTDIV seemingly accomplished more WIP with less
people than did NORTHDIV and SOUTHDIV combined. In fact, twenty percent
more. The possible interpretations of this discrepancy are numerous. Was WESTDIV
20% more efficient than the other two EFDs? Was WESTDIV getting shortchanged in
the manpower budgeting process, simply getting tasked to accomplish more work with
fewer resources? And if this was the case, does NAVFAC have a viable manpower
budgeting process? This table was presented to the author and the aforementioned
questions posed.
C. THE GOAL
This thesis answers these questions, and more. The means by which NAVFAC
projects and fulfills its acquisition mission manpower resource requirements from
Congress through the POM process is investigated. Also examined and evaluated is
how NAVFAC allocates manpower resources to each EFD for the budget year. Taking
this process one step further, the methods by which EFDs allocate these resources
internally among Acquisition Organization Divisions are assessed, and
recommendations for improvements are made.
D. METHODS OF ACHIEVEMENT
At the start of this thesis, I was almost totally unfamiliar with the mission
responsibilities and organizational structure of an EFD, and completely without
knowledge of the manpower budgeting process. The statistics in Table 1 represented a
potential problem in the allocation of manpower resources that needed to be addressed.
Research involved a long course of events starting with learning what an EFD does
and how it performs its responsibilities. Numerous interviews were conducted with
WESTDIV personnel in the Acquisition Department and Office of the Comptroller.
Statistics on staffing and work output were gathered.
Interviews were then conducted with personnel at the Navy Manpower
Engineering Center, Detachment Treasure Island, and I became familiar with the Navy
SHORSTAMPS (Shore Requirements. Standards, and Manpower Planning System). It
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was here that I was made aware of the SHORSTAMPS stalling model used by
NAVFAC.
Research was further fueled by a report prepared by personnel from Public
Works Center, San Francisco, stemming from a management assist at WESTDIV. This
report observed that Code 05 (Construction Division) at WESTDIV had reviewed
other EFD algorithms for determining personnel requirements and had discovered that
there was no consistency between EFD and NAVFAC algorithms. It further
recommended that WESTDIV request that NAVFAC establish realistic WIP to work-
year conversion standards and implement them at all EFDs [Ref. 5: p. 3]. This last
item stemmed from a NAVFAC instruction that provides guidance for stalling
Resident Officer in Charge of Construction Offices (ROICC), the field offices that
administer all Navy shore facility construction contracts. The guidance is based on
total WIP and number of contracts per office. The problem with the instruction is that
if the EFDs staffed their ROICC offices according to the guidance they would need
almost 60% more people for their ROICC offices than they already have, or had been
allotted, and ROICC offices comprise nearly 30% of an EFD's total personnel.
A 1976 thesis written by LCDR D. J. Nash, CEC, L'SN, then a Financial
Management student at NPS, recommended:
A more realistic method of measuring output or activity is needed for for
evaluating an Acquisition department's performance and resource needs at
NAVFAC level. It future workload to staffing conversion factors can .be
developed, a more equitable allocation of resources among the Acquisition
departments in various'EFDs might be possible ....
The basis of the following ideas is that a common svstem of conversion
factors to convert future workload to required staffing should be developed to
permit an improved svstem of allocation of resources 'among EfDs (at least in
the Program III and Program IV areas). First, workload to staffing conversion
factors could be most helpful to the CAB (Command Advisorv Board) as a
predictive device for the allocation of resources among the EFDs.. Second, a
realistic svstem of conversion factors could aid the EFDs in allocation ol their
resources 'among the divisions. Next, the factors could be used as a measure ol^
comparative performance among the EFDs over a given period. Finally, and
most important, these conversion factors could be used to construct the budget
base for NAVFAC to be used in obtaining resources from higher authorities.
This aspect mav become more important with the advent of Zero Base
Budgeting. [Ref. '6: pp. 1 16-117]
It seemed that in ten years NAVFAC had made little or no progress in the area
of manpower staffing.
A questionnaire was sent to the Acquisition Department heads at each EFD
requesting statistical information as well as methods by which manpower requirements
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are determined. Follow-up telephone interviews were conducted with the 02. 04, and 05
Division Directors at each EFD to gain further insight into the manpower budgeting
process. Additionally, the Information Systems Division at WESTDIV ran computer
programs from NAVFAC's IPMS and CMS data base systems to extract special data
on labor inputs and workload for the EFD Acquisition Organizations. Important
conclusions were drawn from analysis of these statistics.
Manpower staffing and forecasting processes at civilian and government
organizations with missions similar to NAVFAC were explored. Interviews were
conducted with personnel at Bechtel Engineering International in San Francisco and
the Army Corps of Engineers Monterey Field Office and District Office in Sacramento.
Funding was then obtained for a two-day trip to NAVFAC HQ in Alexandria,
Virginia. In-depth interviews were conducted with personnel who make the final
manpower resource allocation decisions to the EFDs and on whose written testimony
Congressional action is taken regarding manpower budgeting. It was here that the
strengths and weaknesses of NAVFAC's manpower budgeting system became
apparent, as well as the limitations of any statistical system that could possibly be used
in such a complex environment as that in which the Navy works. It is also where I
began to formulate my recommendations for improvements to the current system. I
was also extremely fortunate to come across brief excerpts from an Army Corps of
Engineers (ACE) 1985 report on development of their own manpower forecasting
system. This report led me to the ACE headquarters in Washington, DC, and there I
interviewed personnel who had recently concluded development of a headquarters-level
manpower forecasting system. I also received a report done under contract to the
Army by the Logistics Management Institute entitled, "Forecasting Corps of Engineers
Military Construction Manpower Requirements: A Prototype Model." Additionally,
throughout this time numerous civilian and government publications on the subject of
manpower demand forecasting were reviewed.
E. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH RESULTS
From a slate blank of knowledge, my research has educated me tremendously. It
is my assessment that the methodology that NAVFAC used in developing their
SHORSTAMPS stalling standard to forecast manpower requirements for the Facilities
Acquisition mission is valid. However, because this staffing model was developed using
a limited data base-only FY 79 data-its accuracy is questioned given the changes that
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have occurred in the means by which NAVFAC carries out its facilities acquisition
mission, fluctuations in workload since the model's inception, and changes in the
contracting environment. This thesis updates this model using FY 85 and FY 86 data.
Although five of eight regression coefficients in this updated model were very similar in
value (within 10%) to those developed by NAVFAC. three of the remaining variables
had orders of magnitude differences. These differences could potentially cause
NAVFAC's manpower forecast to underestimate "true" requirements, given particular
changes in workload composition from those that existed in 1979. Other factors, not
quantified in the SHORSTAMPS model, also influence resource allocation. This thesis
makes observations on these "other" factors and recommends changes to the way some
are interpreted. It also introduces additional influences to be considered when
NAVFAC allocates Programs IV and IX resources to the EFDs.
The means by which EFDs internally allocate resources among Divisions is
described and appraised. Although there are no published methods to be used as
guidance by the EFDs, general methods tended to be similar. Some EFDs did have
more formal systems than others and it is hoped that, by describing these, ideas may
be spawned for improvements.
Much of manpower demand forecasting relies on statistical analysis. As much as
possible, to simplify communicating the results of my research, complex calculations
and analyses are avoided. Instead, the results of analyses done by other researchers are
summarized, referenced, and in some cases revised with more current data. Unless
warranted, no attempt was made to validate the conclusions of statistical analyses done
by others and used as references in this thesis.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis continues with Chapter II providing background information on
NAVFAC and the EFDs, the facility acquisition process, and factors that affect
manpower staffing. Chapter III provides an overview of current methods of manpower
demand forecasting gleaned from civilian periodicals, the Navy SHORSTAMPS
program, and the Air Force Management Engineering Program. In Chapter IV the
evolution of NAVFAC's acquisition mission manpower forecasting model is described
and its validity evaluated. Similarly with the Army Corps of Engineers' new model, and
the two models are compared. Factors not quantified by NAVFAC's model are
described, and recommendations made as to their influences. Chapter IV continues by
20
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describing information gathered and results of interviews with the EFD Progra
Division Directors and assesses EFD internal resource allocation processes. Chapter V
presents recommendations and conclusions.
21
II. BACKGROUND
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command is in a unique business: performing
the acquisition, maintenance, and disposal of Naval shore (and ocean) facilities. It does
have its counterparts in other areas of government: the Army Corps of Engineers and
the General Services Administration; however, there are major structural differences
between these organizations and NAVFAC, which preclude one organization from
directly adopting another's staffing methods. However, the Army Corps of Engineers
does have a Facilities Acquisition organization, and they do go through an acquisition
process similar to NAVFAC, so manpower staffing methods for NAVFAC and ACE
will be compared for the facilities acquisition mission. In the private sector few, if any
companies, perform the same broad mission as NAVFAC. Most companies specialize
in facility design, construction, project management, or. a few, in facilities
management. Those companies that do perform integrated missions along the line of
NAVFAC do so under different "rules." The Government operates under stringent
contracting regulations, with less flexibility in recruiting staff, and Government
inspection procedures and reporting requirements make comparisons of manpower
staffing methods with the private sector exceedingly difficult.
In order to answer the question. "How many people do we need?", for the entire
NAVFAC command structure, and for each EFD, the reader must understand the
organizational structure and mission of NAVFAC and the EFDs, the facility
acquisition process, the manpower acquisition process, and the numerous factors that
affect manpower staffing. This chapter describes the aforementioned aspects, presents
general trends in work output and staffing, and delves into the complexity of
manpower budgeting for an organization as unique as NAVFAC.
It should be noted that literally volumes of literature have been written on the
mission and organization of NAVFAC, and the facility acquisition process. This
chapter summarizes these topics and highlights those areas that are particularly
pertinent in the manpower budgeting process.
This chapter is organized such that after each major section, (1) Mission and
Organization of NAVFAC, (2) EFD Organization, and (3) Facilities/ Manpower
Acquisition Process, influences of that section on manpower staffing are addressed.
>->
This chapter then concludes with a summarization of these influences and introduces
further factors in manpower stalling, unique to NAVFAC and each EFD, that must be
taken into account when performing manpower budgeting. This chapter provides a
lead-in to Chapters III and IV where the means to deal with these factors is addressed.
A. MISSION OF THE NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND
NAVFAC's mission can be grouped into four broad categories: facilities and real
estate planning, acquisition of new facilities, facilities management (public works), and
military readiness. 4 The following is a brief description of these missions:
Facilities Planning involves assisting shore activities in determining their facilities
requirements, programming the correction of facility deficiencies, preparation of the
Navy's annual military construction budget, master planning, and management of the
Navy's nearly five million acres of real estate.
According to the NAVFAC P-68 Contracting Manual, Acquisition involves "The
acquiring by contract, with appropriated funds, of supplies or services (including
construction) by and for the use of the Federal Government through purchase or lease
. . . Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are established and includes the
description of requirements to satisfy agency needs, solicitation and selection of
sources, award of contracts, contract performance, and contract administration."
[Ref. 7: p. 1.2.5] For NAVFAC, Acquisition involves providing architectural and
engineering design and construction of the Navy shore facilities, as well as fixed surface
and subsurface ocean structures. Acquisition not only refers to new construction, but
to maintenance and repair projects as well.
As part of the Congressionally appropriated Military Construction (MILCON)
program process, NAVFAC is involved in testifying before the various committees in
the House and Senate as they are considering a given year's Military Construction
(NAVY) bill. NAVFAC is then charged directly with accomplishing the acquisition of
the various projects included in the Navy's part of that year's MILCON bill. Facilities
are also acquired by using funds from sources other than MILCON which must
proceed through the five-year-long Planning, Programming, and Budgeting process for
approval. Projects funded from Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations
from Activity and Claimant annual budgets now comprise one-third of NAVFAC's
construction efforts, a significant increase over just 10 years ago. NAVFAC also
4The sources for most of this section were interviews with NAVFAC and EFD
personnel, and the NAVFAC Organization Manual.
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accomplishes acquisition of facilities for other services and government agencies. This
thesis addresses manpower stalling for the acquisition mission.
Facilities Management includes providing technical and managerial advice and
assistance regarding:
Facilities minor construction and major repair projects;
Facilities fire protection engineering and fire fighting;
Utilities management and operation;
Management and operation of transportation and weight handling equipment;
Programming, planning, design, construction, acquisition and disposal of familv
housing.
Military Readiness is primarily associated with the support of the Naval
Construction Force, as well as the planning and R&D necessary to maintain the
capability of providing engineering and related logistics support to the Navy's
operating forces in the event of armed conflict.
As can be seen. NAVFAC truly has an integrated mission: planning for facilities,
acquiring (constructing) them, and then performing facility maintenance and disposal.
One of the factors complicating the allocation of resources by NAVFAC to the
FFDs is that three of the CONL'S EFDs have portions o( the NAVFAC mission
assigned as unique taskings. These will be described later in this chapter.
1. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Field Activities
The four categories of NAVFAC's mission are executed through a field
organization. The first three elements of the mission, facilities planning, acquisition,
and management, are executed by six Engineering Field Divisions (EFDs). each of
which is responsible for a specific geographical area. The following excerpt from
NAVFAC Instruction 5450.7 briefly elaborates on the mission of the EFDs:
To accomplish the planning, design, and construction of public works,
public utilities, and special Facilities ... to acquire and dispose of real, estate . . .
to provide technical advice and assistance on the maintenance of facilities ... to
administer the assignment, replacement and disposal of transportation,
construction, fire fighting, and weight handling equipment .... [Ref. 8: p. 1J
The fourth aspect of NAVFAC's mission, military readiness, is carried out by
two Construction Battalion Centers, one located in Port Hueneme. California, and the
other in Gulfport, Mississippi. Figure 2.1 shows the major field activities of NAVFAC.
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There are six EFDs that serve the U.S. and the Atlantic and Pacific areas:
Northern Division (NORTHDIV, or ND), located in Philadelphia, administers
the northeastern region oi the U.S.
Southern Division (SOUTHDIV, or SD), located in Charleston, administers the
southern region oi the U.S.
Chesapeake Division (CHESDIV, CD), located in Washington, D.C.,
administers the nation s capitol area.
Western Division (WESTDIV, or WD), located in San Bruno, California,
administers the western region of the U.S. and Alaska.
Pacific Division (PACDiV). located in Pearl Harbor, administers the Paciiic
region ot the world, including Japan, the Philippine Islands, and the Marianas
Islands.
Atlantic Division (LANTDIV), located in Norfolk, administers the Atlantic
region of the world, including Europe, the Middle East, Iceland, and Africa.
Figure 2.2 depicts the EFD geographical responsibilities for the Continental
United States (CONUS).
Pausing for a moment. I realize that managers at NAVFAC or an EFD may
dismiss this section of the thesis as "old hat" and question the relevance of this
discourse on manpower staffing. In fact, it is quite relevant. Manpower stalling must
not only take into account the volume of the obvious types of work output, but also
the demographics of areas served, missions unique to a particular EFD, the numbers
and dispersion of activities served, the general capabilities of contractors in a
geographical area, the organizational structure of an EFD. and the numerous other
factors that contribute to the uniqueness of a particular EFD. If all EFDs were the
"same." manpower budgeting at NAVFAC would simply be a matter of relating basic
outputs to inputs. The influences of these factors will be discussed throughout this
chapter.
NAVFAC facilities management is executed by Public Works Departments
(PWDs) located at individual Naval shore activities, or through nine Public Works
Centers (PWCs), which are located in areas where there are concentrations of Naval
Activities. These PWCs are separate commands and operate like non-profit businesses.
The PWDs and PWCs receive technical and management support from the EFD within
whose geographical area they are located; however. CONUS PWCs fall under
NAVFAC's direct chain of command, and, as such, they receive resources and
workload tasking directly from NAVFAC.
To handle a high priority or specialized acquisition project of a large scale,
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Figure 2.2 EFD Geographical Responsibilities
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in Charge of Construction (OICC) organization to oversee the project on a conccption-
to-completion basis. These organizations report directly to NAVFAC. NAVFAC
currently has four such organizations: OICC Trident, which was established to oversee
the planning through construction of approximately SI billion in facilities to support
the Trident Submarine program, and three other OICC organizations which are now
closing out their constructipn efforts. These include OICC Diego Garcia, OICC Navy-
Medical Command. San Diego, and OICC Travis Air Force Base.
2. NAVFAC Headquarters: Organization and Management Process
NAVFAC headquarters is organized along four broad functional mission
categories, described earlier. NAVFAC headquarters organization is shown in Figure
1.1. In 1959 NAVFAC adopted the Program concept where it grouped its ellbrts into a
series of product and service areas. This concept has been integrated into a system of
Management by Objectives. Today, there are nine Programs that are used by
NAVFAC to set priorities, allocate resources, and evaluate performance. Each of these
Programs has a Program Manager at NAVFAC who oversees the definition of
Program goals and objectives, is involved in projecting and assigning future workload,
and is the primary mentor in allocating resources among NAVFAC field organizations
and in appraising performance towards meeting the assigned goals and objectives.
3. Command Operating Plan
The key documents that communicate NAVFAC's goals, plans, and allocation
of Program resources are the Command Operating Plan (OP-Plan) and Command
Guidance (CG). Each is promulgated yearly. The CG provides overall NAVFAC
direction, management policy, and general goals, and the OP-Plan provides specific
goals and Program resource allocation. These resources are funding dollars and labor
work-years. 5 The basis of the OP-Plan, and of NAVFAC's management policy, is the
As an element of background, formerly Naval activities' people resources were
limited bv on-board ceiling constraints. Now a Naval activity, can have as many people
on board" at a given time as desired. However, at the end o'l the fiscal year the vvork-
years expended'by that activity's personnel cannot exceed the work-vear'ceiling. Work-
years being defined as labor hours expended divided bv the total number of available
work hours in a vear (1775 productive hours). This form of restriction resulted in the
practice of hiring large numbers of temporary personnel at the beginning of a fiscal
year and then terminating their employment later in the vear to meet work"-vear ceiling
constraints. A loophole in manpower stalling that existed until October 1986 was that
work-year ceilings did not constrain an activity to the grade structure of its personnel.
There' was virtually no consideration of the cost of labor. Work-vears were allocated
along with funds fo pay for labor, but if additional O&M funds "were available from
other sources (like facility maintenance) the activity could use these additional funds to
pav for a mix of higher graded GS personnel. As a result. Navv labor costs
skyrocketed. SECNAV Lehman closed this loophole when he enacted the "Managing
to" Payroll" program. Now, activities can no longer use "spare'' O&M funds to pay
labor costs.
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system of Management by Objectives. As stated by RADM J. P. Jones. CEC. L'SN,
Commander NAVFAC, in OP-Plan 86: "I have directed ... the substance of our
annual goals ... to actions which depict truly significant achievements sought during
the fiscal year." [Ref. 4: p. i] For example, the following are excerpts from the FY 86
OP-Plan Program IV goals:
"Major emphasis in FY 86 will be to carry' out our mission in an efficient and
cost effective manner:
a) Improve NAVFAC contracting practices by conducting procurement
Management Review visits
. . . and establishing business clearance review section to
review large negotiated contracts.
b) Improve timeliness of construction project completion and turnover ....
35% Design Completion-Complete all FY 87 MCON projects which have been
authorized for design on a timely basis, to the 35% design stage by 30 November.
Work in Place-Achieve FY 86 Income and Non-Income bearing WIP targets as
follows ..." [Ref. 4: p. 46]
The goals cited in the OP-Plan are mandatory and field activities do not have
flexibility in dealing with the goals as they do, to some extent, with the resource
allocations.
The OP-Plan, being the key document driving the manpower budgeting
process, is not developed in a vacuum but is really a contract negotiated between
NAVFAC and its field activities. The EFDs "agree" to achieve specific goals and, in
turn, NAVFAC provides resources to accomplish these goals. Of course, NAVFAC
receives these resources from CNO and Congress. How these resources are obtained is
addressed later in this chapter. This process (provision of resources to the EFDs)
begins with a tentative allocation of resources through an iterative exchange between
the Program Managers at NAVFAC, the EFDs and the Command Advisory Board
(CAB), a group of senior NAVFAC managers charged with advising the Commander
NAVFAC, and the field activities that will execute the OP-Plan workload. This process
culminates in a Tentative Operating Plan (TOP) which is produced sometime after the
mid-year budget review and sent to the field (EFD and other NAVFAC field activities)
for comment and reclama. Based on this interchange the OP-Plan is then finalized by
the CAB, prior to the start of the fiscal year.
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a. Importance of OP- Plan Goals in Manpower Budgeting
Of interest in the manpower budgeting process is the relative importance
placed on each of the OP-Plan goals by an EFD Commander. For example, if an EFD
has been not been meeting its OP-Plan goals for Design-In-Place (DIP). 6 the
Commander may choose to redirect manpower resources from another Program, or
another Division within Program IV. to the Design Division (The Design Division,
which is responsible for DIP. falls under Program IV). This may be done (and is
actually done quite frequently) regardless of what any staffing equation dictates. M. J.
Mullen, Executive Assistant at the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Sacramento District
Office, described the situation concisely during an interview when he said, "An EFD
Commander will more than likely allocate resources among Divisions by asking
himself. 'Where can I take the greatest risk?, and where can I get the best marginal
return on my labor investment?'" An interesting question in the facilities acquisition
process is, "What Division does provide the greatest 'marginal return' on the
investment of labor?" The ultimate goal of the acquisition process is a completed
facility. To answer this question, the concept of acquisition quality must be addressed,
for quantity of "marginal return" is meaningless without a measure of quality. A
Division can churn out an extra 10 contracts or an additional S5 million WIP with the
addition of one more work-year of labor. But without an accurate measure of quality,
these numbers are meaningless. The concept of quality, and the answer to the question
of "marginal return," will be addressed more fully later in this chapter.
B. EFD ORGANIZATION/FUNCTIONAL STATEMENTS
This information in this section comes from interviews with personnel at each of
the EFDs and NAVFAC and from reviewing EFD organization manuals.
All EFDs have a Facilities Management and a Facilities Planning Department,
each of which handles their respective part of the EFD mission. Of interest in this
thesis is the Acquisition Organization which is responsible for the design, construction,
and related contract administration for facilities acquisition for all Navy and Marine
Corps Commands, as well as Air Force and other non-Navy customers.
A note on the term Desien-In-Place (DIP). Before a project ever comes under
design its total construction cost is estimated using parametric procedures. DIP is
measured at anv point in time in the design life of a project bv estimating the percent
completion of design and equating that fo its corresponding construction value. For
example, if the estimated construction cost of a project was SI 00 million, and its design
was 50% complete, then the value of DIP is S50 million.
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The term "Acquisition Department" is purposely avoided although it is depicted
in Figure 1.2: the reason is that the standard EFD organization is now being
challenged under a pilot program initiated by NORTHDIV. However, the basic entities
of an Acquisition Organization are similar across all EFDs.
Acquisition Project Management Office (Code 09A2 or 50) handles the project
management function. This office coordinates the work efforts of the Contract, Design,
and Construction Divisions and is responsible for execution of all acquisition projects
from the feasibility study stage, through design to construction and transfer to
sponsors/customers. A comparison of the structural organization of this Division
across the EFDs revealed that 09A2 is primarily organized by function, with project
managers responsible for particular functional areas such as waterfront projects, airfield
projects, etc. This organization is characterized by a large minimum staffing level
(compared to the entire Division) which is independent of workload in a broad
minimum-to-maximum range.
Acquisition Coordination Office (Code 09A1) coordinates the overall resources
program for the Acquisition Department. It is concerned with utilizing monetary
allotments and personnel resources to comply with on-going requirements. At some
EFDs this office is part of 09A2, while at others it is a separate office.
Contracts Division (Code 02) performs the contractual tasks required in the
procurement of facilities. It is responsible for procedures and actions taken in
solicitation of bids and proposals, the award of contracts, and change orders. A
comparison of the structural organization of this Division across the EFDs showed
that 02 is organized virtually the same at each EFD. This Division is functionally
organized with branches for construction contracts, facility support contracts,
architect-engineer contracts, and an administrative services branch. Because this
Division is segmented to a lesser extent than the other Acquisition Organization
Divisions, the staffing levels in 02 are much more responsive to absolute workload
changes. Figure 2.3 depicts SOUTHDIV's Code 02 organization. The other EFD
Codes 02 are similarly organized.
Design Division (Code 04) is responsible for the design, engineering, and
estimation of costs of facilities to be constructed. As stated in the NAVFAC P-68:
"The Design Division shall primarily be responsible for the adequacy of the plans and
specifications. It shall assure that specifications are clear and unambiguous..." Most of
NAVFAC's project designs are done under contract by private Architect-Engineering
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(A-E) firms. The Design Division oversees this work, ensuring the design conforms
with NAVFAC standards and customer requirements. Approximately 15% of
MILCON design is accomplished in-house by Design Division personnel. Figure 2.4
depicts LANTDIV's Code 04. The other EFD Codes 04 are similarly organized.
Construction Division (Code 05) provides construction management and
surveillance during the construction of facilities. This it accomplishes through a staff at
the EFD headquarters and a field staff-the Resident Officer in Charge of Construction
(ROICC) and Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC). A brief, but more detailed
discussion of the Construction Division is warranted because of the size (typically 1 3
of an EFD's total staff) and responsibilities of this division. [Ref. 9]
Table 2 depicts the general distribution of personnel resources in each CONUS
EFD's Acquisition Organization.
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF EFD ACQUISITION ORGANIZATION
RESOURCES, FY 86
Percentage Distribution
EFD 05/ROICC 04 02 09A2/50/09A1
ND 56% 20% 15% 9%
CD 56 20 18 6
SD 58 24 8 10
WD 55 22 12 11








1. NAVFAC Contracting Authority
In order to understand how 05 executes its responsibilities, a brief overview of
the authority to perform facility procurement is required. This section draws primarily
on the NAVFAC P-68 Contracting Manual, as well as my experience in a ROICC
office.
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Responsibility for Navy procurement is vested, by statute, in the Secretary of
the Navy. The Secretary- has delegated this responsibility to the Navy Systems
Commanders for procurement of supplies and services for their areas of cognizance.
The Commander NAVFAC is designated as "Contracting Officer" for the procurement
of specific facility and transportation related items. As stated in the P-68:
.
Only Contractine Officers are authorized to enter into, modifv and or
terminate contracts. Ihev also issue final decisions on contract disputes, chair
selection and negotiation boards, and approve actions such as bid irregularity
disposition, business clearances, board reports, and ensure compliance with the
terms ol the contract. [Ref. 7: p. 1.4.1]
2. EFDs' Contracting Authority
The Commander NAVFAC has redelegated to the EFD Commanders
Contracting Officer authority. As stated in the P-6S Contracting Manual, this includes
authority for the award and administration of the following types of procurement
actions (this list is not all inclusive):
Sealed bid contracts for new construction, repair or alteration.
Sealed bid purchase contracts for specialized materials and equipment not
available through regular supply channels.
Sealed bid contracts for demolition and removal of buildings and structures.
The slating, selection and negotiation of Architect-Engineer and Engineering
Service contracts. [Ref. 7: p. 1.4.1]
Authority for negotiated construction contracts is delegated on a case-by-case
basis.
3. Officer in Charge of Construction
An EFD Commander can redelegate all or part of his contracting authority to
field personnel within his EFD's geographical area of responsibility. This authority is
called Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC, or OIC) authority. Normally, he will
delegate OICC authority to Navy Civil Engineer Corps Officers who are assigned as
Public Works Officers of specific activities, primarily for the purpose of executing the
design and construction of projects funded at the activity level. These are primarily
Real Property Maintenance (RPM) projects or Facility Support Contracts funded from
the activity's Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds, or "Special" projects funded
by Viajor Claimant O&M funds. 7 Facility Support Contracts are NAVFAC contracts
O&M funded projects do not receive Congressional, approval by individual
Project as do MILCON" projects, and thus avoid the five-year long Planning,
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for public works services such as janitorial services, security services, groundskeeping.
utilities maintenance, etc. These contracts now consist of more than 15% of the EFDs
WIP efforts (dollar value of Facility Support Contracts are considered WIP), nearly
triple the amount of just seven years ago. 8 This growth is largely the result of the
Commercial Activities Program, described in Chapter III. This OICC authority covers
the entire spectrum of the facilities procurement process: preparation of the plans and
specifications for a project, advertising and awarding a construction contract, and the
administration of these contracts. This authority is specified in the same language as it
is delegated to the EFD. except that dollar limits are imposed for each contract
category.
4. Resident Officer in Charge of Construction
The construction contracts for virtually all MILCON projects administered by
the four CONUS EFDs are administered through ROICC offices. Additionally.
ROICC offices also administer the majority of O&M funded RPM, Facility Support
Contracts and "Special'' projects. The ROICC office is a field unit of the EFD and has
the job of administering construction contracts that an EFD or OICC has awarded.
The majority of ROICC offices are co-located with the major Public Works
Department or Public Works Center, in a particular area. Most ROICC offices also
have OICC authority, and thus a self-contained contracting staff (02 types) may also
reside within a ROICC Office.
A note on the term "contract administration:" As defined in the P-68, contract
administration is the "process of making payments and assuring that a contractor
provides that which is required under a contract which includes monitoring contractor
progress, performing quality assurance, and providing or obtaining technical reviews
and approvals." [Ref. 7: p. 1.2.8]
Figure 2.5 depicts SOUTHDIV's ROICC organization, which is similar in
structure to the other EFDs.
5. Construction Division Headquarters Staff
The 05 headquarters staff provides administrative and overhead support to the
OICC ROICC field offices. Their responsibilites include providing construction policy
guidance, developing staffing structures, participating in labor management meetings
approval funding appropriation. However, costs of "new construction" O&M funded
projects cannot exceed y200,000.
8 Source: FACSO reports on EFD WIP.
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and negotiations, and administering the construction safety program [Ref. 9: p. 34].
Thesis research included interviewing the 05 Division Directors to find out what
stalling methods they used for their field oflices. Some were quite innovative and will
he described later. In fact, one method could usefully be adapted by other EFD
Divisions.
6. Differences in CONUS and OCONUS EFD Organizations for
Facilities Acquisition
Earlier it was stated that the scope of this research primarily concerns the
EFDs with CONUS responsibilities. Because of the wide geographical dispersion of the
activities served by LANTDIV and PACD1V and the differences in doing business
overseas, these two EFDs are organized differently than the EFDs with only CONUS
responsibilities. PACD1V accomplishes its facilities acquisition responsibilities through
five OICC organizations, and LANTDIV carries out all of its acquisition
responsibilities in Europe through one OICC. These OICCs carry out the project
management, design and construction administration functions for each of the Naval
activities within their respective geographical areas, while the EFDs with CONUS
responsibilities do most of the design and project management at the EFD.
Construction contract administration is performed at various ROICC offices located at
or near the construction site.
7. Differences in EFD Acquisition Organizations
Returning now to the discussion on Acquisition organizations, the "tvpical"
EFD Acquisition Department is now undergoing significant changes, initiated by
NORTHDIV. In a pilot program, begun in 1985, NOR MIDI V changed its
organizational structure, moving the Design and Project Management Divisions from
the Facilities Acquisition Department (09A) to a newly created Facilities Engineering
Department (09X). Figure 1.2 depicts a "typical" EFD and 09A organization. Figures
2.6 and 2.7 present NORTHDIV's EFD pilot organization and their 09X Department.
In addition to this structural realignment, there was a functional realignment among
Divisions. For example, WES I DIV's Design Division (Code 04) is responsible for the
administration of Architect-Engineer contracts, a substantial effort. Under
NORTHDIV's functional realignment, this responsibility has shifted to the 05 staff at
EFD headquarters. In fact, at each EFD interviewed, certain administrative clforts
varied from Division to Division. Thus, the 05 Division at SOUTHDIV did not entirely
















































































































































if <** UJ 2O



























LU M ^ |] Q. )
——
—










































































Figure 2.7 NORTHDIV's Facilities Engineering Department
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Also, there are differences in the way each Division accounts for people. For
example, at the ROICC offices some EFDs count the personnel who perform contracts
administration tasks (preparation and award of contracts) as part of the 02 Division
while others count these personnel as part of the 05 Division.
S. Complexities of "Universal" Divisional Budgeting Methods
While the overall missions of the EFDs are similar, and NAVFAC has
promulgated a "typical" EFD organization structure, in fact, significant differences in
structure and Division responsibilities exist from EFD to EFD. as shown. This
complicates the manpower budgeting process in several ways:
• It frustrates the development of a universal manpower budgeting system for
similar Divisions of the EFDs. For example, the specific" tastings of the
Contracts Division at WESTDIV differ from those at NORTHDIV. Thus, any-
universal process would need to take these differences into account, and would
be hard pressed to do so.
• Direct comparison of productivity bv EFD Division would not be entirely
accurate, thus hindering the management evaluation process, and any direct
comparisons between Divisions.
• The case for budgeting bv segmentation, or for NAVFAC to allocate resources
by Division at an EFD," is "diminished. NAVFAC simplv does not have the
management resources to make such micro-level decisions.'
9. Program Concept Facilitates Manpower Budgeting
Nonetheless, because the overall missions of the EFDs are similar,
comparisons can be made EFD to EFD and a "universal" budgeting process for the
EFDs is possible. That NAVFAC executes its responsibilities through a Program
concept, facilitates the assignment of EFD goals and the allocation of resources. Thus,
regardless of differences in Division responsibilities from EFD to EFD. the Program IV
and IX goals are carried out through the integrated efforts of the entire acquisition
organization. This thesis addresses the resources used for Program IV and the Facilities
Support Contracts aspect of Program IX. These two Programs (IV&IX) include all of
the personnel in the 05, 02, 09A1. and Project Management Divisions (09A2 or 50
depending on the EFD), and approximately 75% of the work-years consumed by the
04 Division.
The EFD Programs IX and IV workload are somewhat unique among
Programs in that they are less of a negotiated tasking and more of an assigned tasking.
The primary7 efforts of these Programs are WIP, and this WIP is primarily Military
Construction (MILCON) and O&M work. VIILCON is defined as "new" construction
projects above a S200,000 threshold that receive approval and funding appropriation
on an individual basis from Congress. The MILCON acquisition process is described in
greater detail in the next section.
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As MILCON is determined primarily by yearly Congressional appropriations,
to a large degree it is independent of EFD influences. Similarly with O&M funded
projects, which are determined by individual Naval shore activities. As will be explained
in the next section, the manner by which the workload of Programs IV and IX is
assigned to an EFD significantly impacts the manpower budgeting process. Of course,
prior to construction work's actually proceeding on a project, design must be
completed and a contract for construction awarded, both of which are governed by
EFD efforts. Delays in design or contract award affect the timing of both construction
efforts and resource requirements. Thus, an EFD can come under considerable pressure
by "customers" to expedite the design and award of contracts. The requirement to have
the right numbers of people to do the job becomes evident.
C. THE FACILITIES ACQUISITION PROCESS/MANPOWER BUDGETING
PROCESS
With a background in the mission and organization of NAVFAC in hand, this
next section will provide an overview of the facilities acquisition process and manpower
budgeting process as it pertains to the Programs IV&IX functions at NAVFAC. This
section is divided into three subsections. The first begins with the process for Military
Construction (MILCON), which comprises approximately 40% of the EFDs' WIP.
Also addressed are 0&.M funded RPM and Facility Support Contracts which are
taking an increasing share of the EFDs' work efforts and are significantly impacting
the manpower budgeting process. The second subsection provides an overview of the
manpower budgeting and acquisition process for the Navy and NAVFAC. The final




The acquisition of MILCON funded facilities follows DoD's Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). PPBS is simply a decision making
process for allocating defense resources. It is a continuous process running in two-year
cycles. It involves four major players at the Washington, D.C., level: Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Services. Through an iterative process the "players" move
from broad planning considerations, to more definitive program objectives, to finally
specific budget estimates which price-out the programs. The Planning, Programming,
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and Budgeting System can he summarized in a few words: Based on the anticipated
Threat, a Strategy is developed. Requirements of the strategy are then estimated and
Programs are developed to package and execute the strategy. Finally, the costs of
approved programs are Budgeted. Figure 2.8 depicts the overall PPBS process.
[Ref. 10: p. A-9]
b. Planning for MILCON Projects
The planning for shore facilities acquisition occurs under the Navy's Shore
Facilities Planning System (SFPS). This is a process that determines which facilities are
needed to perform assigned missions, which facilities are in place and their condition,
how well existing facilities are used, and what has been done to achieve efficient
facilities utilization. Shore Facilities Planning consists of the following steps:
1. Assignment of missions and tasks by OPNAV to each activity of the Shore
Establishment.
2. Determination of base loading. The Shore Base Loading Report, an extract
from the Five Year Defense Han, projects the assignment of men, ships, and
aircraft to activities through the next five years.
3. Development of the Basic Facilities Requirements to support the assigned
mission and loading, using planning criteria published by NAVFAC.
4. Comparison of approved requirements and existing assets at the activity.
5. Determination of excesses and deficiencies. Excesses are evaluated for possible
conversion or disposal, and deficiencies are evaluated to determine how they
may best be satisfied.
6. Submission of construction projects. For those deficiencies which must be met
by construction, construction projects are developed and submitted through the
major claimants to NAVFAC where they are entered in the MILCOX
Requirements List, a data base of all pending' MI LCON projects. [Ref. 11: p. 3]
The Navy can only build those projects for which Congress authorizes and
appropriates funds. Congress passes separate military construction legislation each year
to authorize construction projects and appropriate the necessary funds. The House and
Senate Armed Services Committees, which have jurisdiction over authorization, and the
Appropriation Committees, which provide Military Construction funds, have each
established subcommittees to handle Military Construction matters. These four
subcommittees all take an active interest in construction and review the annual














Figure 2.8 PPBS Process
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c. Programming Phase
(1) Background. Most MILCON projects are not developed in isolation
but are in response to "Fleet" requirements. The acquisition of new aircraft or ships
and the Strategic Homeporting program are examples where a mission change or the
addition of a new weapons system require new facilities to support these initiatives. As
the "Fleet" goes, so does the facility acquisition program. A background is thus needed
in how the Navy's response to the Threat is translated into budget line items. The
Programming Phase provides this bridge.
Programming has been referred to as the art of equitably distributing
resources within fiscal constraints. The basic purpose of the programming phase in
PPBS is to translate the strategy into program force structures in terms o[ resource
requirements including personnel, monies, facilities, and weapons systems. This is
accomplished by systematic approval procedures that "cost out" force objectives for
financial and manpower resources five years into the future. [Ref. 10: p. A- 10]
The programming phase of the DoD PPBS cycle commences with the
promulgation of the Defense Guidance by the Secretary of Defense. This document
provides guidelines that must be observed by the JCS, the Military Departments, and
Defense Agencies, in the formulation of force structures and Five Year Defense
Program (FYDP). [Ref. 10: p. A- 10]
The Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) is the official summary of
programs approved by the Secretary of Defense. The FYDP specifies force levels in
terms of major mission programs. The FYDP serves as the controlling internal
working mechanism of the DoD PPB system. [Ref. 10: p. A-10]
The critical document during the Programming Phase is the Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM). POM's are prepared by each of the Services in
response to the Defense Guidance from SECDEF. The purpose of a POM is to express
total program requirements in terms of force structure, manpower, facilities, materials
and costs, to satisfy all assigned functions and responsibilities during the period of the
Five Year Defense Program. The POM is developed by fiscal year and concentrates on
the fiscal year that is two years in advance of the current fiscal year. [Ref. 12: p. 3-3]
About thirty days after the Services publish their Program Objective
Memoranda, the JCS issue the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). The
JPAM gives the views of the Joint Chiefs on the adequacy of the composite force and
resource levels presented in the Service POMs. The SECDEF considers the Joint
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Chiefs analyses when deciding program issues, and his review of the Service POMs
culminates in the drafting of Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). These decisions
include intended adjustments in the POM submissions. Reclamas to these decisions
may be submitted by the military departments; then final Program Decisions are issued.
[Ref. 10: p. A- 11]
(2) MILCON Programming. MILCON programming is essentially the
evaluation of competing requirements Navy-wide to determine the resources that can
be devoted to construction programs, and the evaluation of competing construction
projects to select those to be accomplished within the resources available for a given
program year. [Ref. 11: p. 7]
The FY 86 Military Construction Program was approved by Congress
at S1.7 billion, a slight increase over the FY 85 program that was approved at S1.6
billion. The FY 87 program submitted to Congress was for Sl.S billion. The FY 88-91
programs range from S2.2 to S2.9 billion. Major items in the FY 87 budget included
SI 98 million for the Trident program and SI 57 million for strategic homeporting.
[Ref. 11: p. 8]
It should be emphasized that facility requirements, and the selection of
a program year's MILCON projects, are determined by the "Fleet" and the entire Navy
Shore Establishment, not by NAVFAC. NAVFAC acts purely in an advisory capacity
during this process. For example, when the acquisition of the F/A-18 aircraft was
entered into the POM. the aircraft was not a "stand-alone" package. Among other
support requirements, the Navy also included in the POM facilities to house and repair
the aircraft. NAVFAC entered into the picture by advising NAVAIR. the Resource
Sponsor responsible for the F/A-18 program, what facilities were needed to support the
aircraft.
Each year programming the correction of the Navy's facility
deficiencies involves the selection of about 400 projects, only about five percent of the
projects listed in the MILCON requirements list. These projects receive authorization
to be designed by the EFDs to what is called the "35% completion" stage. [Ref. 11: p.
9]
d. Budgeting
Budgeting is the final phase in the PPB cycle. The annual budget expresses
the financial requirements necessary to support approved programs that were
developed during the preceding phases of planning and programming. It is through the
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budget that planning and programming are translated into annual funding
requirements.
Normally, the annual Budget Submission to the Secretary of Defense is
made on 15 September, twelve months prior to the applicable fiscal year. The Navy
Comptroller issues the call for the submission of Budget Estimates in early June of
each year prior to the budget submission to SECDEF. [Ref. 10: p. A-12]
On completion of the 35% MILCON design, this information along with
more accurate cost data, is further reviewed at the CNO and NAVCOMPT levels. On
completion of this review, the total program year's construction projects are submitted
for formal review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as part of the Navy's
budget package. SECDEF then holds a series of budget hearings jointly with OMB on
the DoD component requests. These hearings are used by SECDEF to formulate his
Program Budget Decisions (PBD's). which are simply further adjustments to the
Services' budgets (Programs may be cut, previously deleted ones reinstated, or existing
Programs expanded). The surviving projects for each of the three services are
consolidated into a unified DoD MILCON Authorization Bill and submitted to OMB
for incorporation into the President's budget, which the President will submit to
Congress in January preceding the fiscal year covered by the proposed budget.
[Ref. 10: p. A- 13]
Meanwhile NAVFAC has proceeded with 100% design of the Navy's
projects. The Navy also acts as the design agent for the Marine Corps and certain Air
Force and NATO projects. The final review by Congress may further eliminate projects
from that year's program, or new projects may be added. Thus NAVFAC may have
completed the design of a project and begun staffing particular ROICC offices, only to
have construction authorization delayed until next year, or the project may never
receive Congressional approval. Figure 2.9 depicts a time-line of this process.
Once funds are appropriated for construction of a MILCON project, and
design is complete, the Contracts Division advertises and awards a construction
contract. Once awarded the contract is turned over to the ROICC responsible for the
area in which construction takes place. It is then the responsibility o[ the ROICC
Office to administer the contract until completion. The responsibility of the other
Acquisition Organization Divisions, however, does not end at this point. The Contracts
Division may be called upon to provide advice on any contract modifications or, if a
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this Division will have to conduct a Business Clearance and negotiate the
modification—a very time consuming process. The Design Division may be called upon
to provide engineering advice or to perform design and cost estimation for a change
order. The total of these efforts influences the need for manpower staffing, yet may not
be reflected in standard workload statistics. Interviews of Contracts Division personnel
indicated that providing consultation and advice to ROICC Offices, much of which
required time-consuming research effort, was a "significant" part of their daily efforts.
However, no statistics are maintained on number of consultations, etc.
e. Operations and Maintenance Funded Projects
Activity Commanding Officers have authority, using their station O&M
funds, to perform minor construction and alteration projects not to exceed S25.000,
and repair projects not to exceed S75,000. Through a Special Project submission
process activities can receive up to S200.000 in O&M funds from their Major Claimant
to perform minor construction and alteration projects. There is no dollar limitation to
Major Claimant O&Vl funded repair projects [Ref. 13: p. 32]. There is, of course,
course, strict guidance on what constitutes a construction project and what is a repair
project. O&M funded projects do not receive the same Congressional scrutiny as do
MILCON projects and do not have to individually go through the five year PPB
process to receive funding. Special Projects submitted by activities are reviewed by
Major Claimants annually and must compete for limited O&VI funds on the basis of
priority and urgency. Needless to say, only a small percentage of Special Projects
submitted by activities are funded. Design and construction contracts for these projects
are awarded by local OICCs and administered by local ROICC offices. EFDs only get
involved in O&M projects that exceed the contracting authority of the local OICC.
2. Manpower Acquisition Process
Navy manpower requirements are included as part of the PPB process.
Manpower requirements are first introduced into the system during development of the
POM and then follow through the PPB process as with the acquisition of any other
resource. As mentioned earlier, NAVFAC is not the "prime mover" in the facilities
programming process. It simply acts in an advisory capacity to the "Fleet" in the
programming of MILCON projects. However, NAVFAC is responsible for facilities
acquisition once MILCON projects are programmed, and thus it must determine its
personnel requirements to earn1 out this mission. As such, during the POM process.
NAVFAC is responsible to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower,
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Personnel, and Training) for providing its (NAVFAC's) requirements, not only for the
budget year, but for live years hence [Ref. 12: p. 3-4]. As will be shown in the
remainder of this chapter, this task (not an easy one to begin with) is complicated by
numerous quirks of the "system" and "outside" factors other than workload. Since the
Naval Material Command was abolished, NAVFAC now "stands alone" as a Systems
Command and must be able to defend its budget before Congress, as must any of the
Operating Force Commands. With a manpower budget approaching S140 million, the
need for a credible manpower forecasting system is evident.
3. Effects of the Acquisition Process on Manpower Staffing
The nuances of the facilities acquisition process have particular effects on
manpower budgeting. These effects can be divided into three main categories:
forecasting, stability, and continuity.
a. Forecasting
Starting with MILCON, the structure of this budget process facilitates
workload forecasting for the FFDs. Starting with the Design Division, since the
primary workload of this Division is MILCON projects, they can (and do) examine the
current year's MILCON authorization bill before Congress, or the pending selection of
projects for 35% design from the MILCON requirements list, to forecast their
workload and develop a manpower budget. Similarly the Contracts Division, which
primarily awards contracts for Architect-Engineer design, and construction, of
MILCON projects, is able to forecast workload and develop a manpower budget
system. The Construction Division, using the CMS management information system, is
also able to project ROICC workload up to 18 months in advance, and thus staff their
offices accordingly.
Special Projects and activity funded O&M projects are much more difficult
to forecast, and because of the increased dollar value and number of projects these
contracts comprise of a ROICC's workload, strong implications exist for manpower
staffing. These projects can be funded at any time during a fiscal year. Activity level
projects in particular go through no formal approval process. Therefore, it is difficult
for a local ROICC office to predict the volume of these projects that it will have to
award and administer. Additionally, O&M funded projects are more administration
effort-intensive for a ROICC office than MILCON funded new construction projects.
O&M funded projects consist primarily of Real Property Maintenance or Repair
projects and Facility Support contracts. While these contracts comprise about 30% of
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an EFDs WIP they make-up more than 75% of the total number of projects: in
contrast. VIILCON funded projects comprise nearly half of NAVFAC's WIP hut
account for less than 15% of the total number of projects. 9 It is much more difficult to
communicate in contractual terms how to perform facility repair or maintenance than
it is to start from ground-zero and a build a new one. This carries over to to inspection
and administration effort. As a result, change orders, or unplanned changes to a
contract, generally considered worse than the plague at a ROICC office because of the
effort required to negotiate and document the change order, are several percentage
points higher per dollar of WIP for Real Property Maintenance projects, or Facility
Support Contracts than new construction MILCOX projects. 10
Generally, ROICC offices and EFDs forecast O&M workload solely based
on past history, and staff accordingly.
b. Stability
Unfortunately, virtually everything mentioned about the ease of forecasting
MILCOX workload goes "out the window" when considering stability. Project stability
is a particularly frustrating aspect of the MILCOX process for the EFD acquisition
organization. Stability refers to the volume of projects that drop out, are radically
changed, or are delayed, after approval has been received to commence 35% design.
Figure 2.10 depicts this situation for the FY 87 MCOX (Military Construction, Navy)
program. This figure shows that more than one-quarter of projects authorized for final
design were not approved by Congress for funding in the fiscal year for which
construction of the project was originally planned. The causes for this situation are
numerous: changing mission, "pork-barrel" politics in Congress, lack of funds, changed
priorities by Major Claimants, etc.
What are the consequences of Program instability? Consider again the
timeline for the budget process. About the time the President is submitting his budget
to Congress a tentative OP-Plan is being developed between XAVFAC and the EFDs.
While Congressional hearings are being held concerning MILCOX projects, XAVFAC
is finishing project design, and planning--and implementing-personnel staffing for
ROICC Offices. The major problem caused by lack of program stability is the inability
of EFDs to rapidly shift resources from one Division to another or from one ROICC
office to another. Thus, WESTDIV might increase staffing at the ROICC office in El
9 Source: XAVFAC Code 05
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Toro. California, only to find that the projects forecasted for this office have been
dropped from the VIILCON program, while at ROICC Fallon, Nevada, two major
MILCOX projects that were placed "on hold" several years ago suddenly receive
approval, because the Congressman from that district now serves on the House Armed
Services Committee and can influence approval of those projects.
Stability also affects staffing statistics. For example, an EFD may increase
staffing in anticipation of a large workload for a particular program year, and then
have a large percentage of these projects delayed or eliminated from the program. As a
result, their "productivity" statistics may be deceptively low, prompting questioning of
efficiency and management practices.
Additionally, projects may be designed to the 35% stage, only to have the
customer determine that the design is something other than what is really desired, and
thus an EFD may need to start the design again from ground zero. All EFD Design
Directors interviewed indicated that this was more than just a rare occurrence, and
these efforts were not measured in the EFD's final DIP output. In fact, no accurate
statistics were maintained on this situation. The effect of this situation is that actual
design work, effort is not truly depicted in standard workload-to-staffing statistics,
which may be used to compare design productivity of EFDs.
Stability is a factor built-in to the budgeting system, and EFDs plan for a
certain amount of program instability. However, stability is not a methodical aspect of
the budgeting process. It is purely random. Thus, an EFD may experience high
program instability in one year and virtually none the next. Unfortunately, statistics on
program stability by EFD were not available to make comparisons, but all EFDs
indicated this was a problem.
c. Continuity
Continuity refers to fluctuations in the EFD and ROICC workload over
time. Figure 2.11 depicts the CONE'S EFDs' WIP (constant FY 79 S) from FY 79-86.
As can be seen, although WIP per EFD has increased over this period, it has not done
so on any linear basis; rather, it has been more on a random basis. Tables 3, 4, 5 and
6 show, for each EFD, the numbers of ROICC Offices divided into three categories
based on WIP for FY 83-86. The categories are: small office (SO- 10 million WIP),
medium office (S 10-20 million WIP). and large office (greater than S20 million WIP).
The last column shows the number of offices that changed more than two categories
during this period, excluding any linear increase or decrease. As can be seen, there is
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much shifting of categories. Figures 2.12 and 2.13 depict EFD'OICC awarded
contracts from FY S2-S6. Again, the numbers bear no relationship from year-to-year.
Figure 2.14 presents design-in-place by EFD from FY S3-86 (constant FY 86 S). The
results are the same. With the EFDs' workload fluctuating as shown, it is difficult to
justify staffing increases to meet a large workload one year when the projections for the
next year are for a decrease in workload. Quite simply, an EFD cannot hire and fire
senior engineers and contract specialists--the personnel needed for Programs IV and
IX-just to have a consistent workload-to-statfing ratio. The staffing policy has been.
however, not to seek middle ground staffing to have slightly excess personnel during
"slack" periods and being slightly understaffed during peak periods, but to staff very
conservatively. Figure 2.15 shows the work-year WTP ratio for FY S4-S6 (constant FY
79S). As shown, all of the EFDs except WESTDIV have experienced declining
WY/WIP ratios, generally indicating staffing has declined with respect to workload.
D. FURTHER COMPLEXITIES
The manpower staffing process for NAVFAC is further complicated by numerous
factors that may be unique to an EFD, to a Division, to a ROICC office, or even to a
particular project. VI any of these factors may be "one-time" influences, particular to
only a certain construction project. For example, the construction of a sophisticated
communications facility may require more labor hours of administration effort than for
construction of a warehouse. Additionally, these "other" factors tend to be largely
unquantiliable. How, for example, can a number or value be assigned to the level of
experience of the personnel in a ROICC office? Yet, a ROICC office with highly
experienced personnel will need a smaller staff than a ROICC office with similar
workload but with a staff largely consisting of inexperienced personnel.
A number of these factors were gathered through interviews with EFD
Acquisition Organization Division Directors and with the Army Corps of Engineers.
They are presented here, divided into two categories: EFD Division level and ROICC
Office project level. The purpose of presenting these staffing factors is to recognize the
complexity of manpower staffing and set the stage for determining methods of dealing with
these factors.
1. EFD/Division Level
Interviews indicated there are nine primary factors (other than workload and
those described in the previous sections of this thesis) that affect staffing. These are
(not in any order of precedence):
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NORTHDIV ROICC WIP CATEGORIES
First row: No. ROICC Offices per WIP Category (WIP $mil)
Second row: Percent Total WIP by Category
#chFY $0-10
WIP$11-20 >$20
83 8 7 3
%tot WIP 15 41 44
84 10 6 3
%tot WIP 19 38 43
85 9 6 5
%tot WIP 13 28 59
86 9 7 4
%tot WIP 10 40 50
Source: CMS data base
WIP in constant FY 86$, millions
Dispersion and Geographical location of Field OlTices
Demographics area costs of areas served
Political considerations, "Visibility" of projects
Economy of Scale
Climate of areas served
Experience level/turnover of personnel
Type of projects (MILCON, RPM, etc.)
Unique missions
Quality of Work.
Dispersion/Location of Field offices affects (1) travel time by headquarters staff
to these offices, (2) the ability of an EFD to shift resources from one field office to
another to cope with workload changes, and (3) the ability of an EFD to recruit staff
for a particular office.
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TABLE 4
SOLTHDIV ROICC VVIP CATEGORIES
First row: No. ROICC Offices per WIP Category (WIP $mil)Second row: Percent Total WIP by Category
#chFY $0-10
WIP$11-20 $>20
83 15 5 4
%tot WIP 19 27 54
84 15 6 3
%tot WIP 20 31 49
85 12 7 5
%tot WIP 14 26 60
86 13 4 7
%tot WIP 15 15 68
Source: NAVFAC CMS data base
W IP in constant F\ S6 S. millions
Addressing these in order:
The Naval activities served bv SOLTHDIV and WESTDIV are particularly
dispersed from the EFD headquarters and travel time to these offices is a
consideration in stalling. Generally, it was felt that the more isolated an office,
the fewer visits and inspections would be made bv headquarters staff to that
office.
WESTDIV and CHESDIV have concentrations of field offices in particular
areas. For WESTDIV, these include the San Diego and San Francisco areas.
For CHESDIV. this is primarily the Washington, D. C, area. Manpower
resources in these areas are more easily shifted from oflice to oflice than for
isolated field (ROICC) offices. If the latter were facing a two-year downturn or
upturn in construction work a more permanent hiring decision would have to
be made instead of internally (to the EFD) shifting resources, such as could be
done in areas concentrated with field offices.
The more isolated the field oflice, such as Adak. Alaska, or Fallon, Nevada, the
more difficult it is to recruit and retain personnel. Thus, an EFD may. make a
conscious decision to retain qualified staff at an isolated ROICC office even
when that oflice faces a downturn in construction, because it may be difficult to
recruit personnel when there is a future upturn in workload. "Conversely, an
EFD mav not be able to recruit enough qualified personnel for an oflice". and
that office mav be continually understaffed. Such is the case with ROICC Camp
Pendelton, California. To make up this shortfall. WESTDIV is increasing the
staffing of Navy Civil Engineer Corps Officers, manv of whom are performing
jobs previously' done bv "civilians. However, due to Congressionalfv imposed
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TABLE 5
WESTDIV ROICC WIP CATEGORIES
First row: No. ROICC Offices per WIP Category (WIP $mil)
Second row: Percent Total WIP by Category
#chFY $0-10
WIP$11-20 $>20
83 6 5 9
%tot WIP 6 15 79
84 7 1 15
%tot WIP 6 10 93
85 6 6 12
%tot WIP 4 10 86
86 8 2 14
%tot WIP 6 4 90
Source: XAVFAC CMS data base
WIP in constant FY 86 S. millions
ceiling levels on the total number of CEC Officers, this is not a viable across-
the-board option.
Demographics/area costs affect the ability of an EFD to recruit and retain
qualified personnel. Government salaries do not vary with location. Thus WESTDIV
and CHESDIV, whose areas of responsibilities are concentrated in the high cost areas
of coastal California and Washington, D.C.. can pay their employees no more than
SOUTHDIV and NORTHDIV, whose areas of responsibility are predominantly in
areas of lower cost. Put another way, engineers and other highly skilled people are
more inclined to work and remain under the employ of the government at SOUTHDIV
and NORTHDIV than at CHESDIV and WESTDIV. This aspect was particularly
emphasized in numerous interviews.
Economy of Scale is an economics term and essentially means that a larger
organization should be able to accomplish proportionately more work than a smaller
organization because of more efficient use of labor, work specialization, etc., until
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TABLE 6





Offices per WIP Category (WIP $mil)
Total WIP by Category
FY $0-10 WIP$11-20 $>20 #ch
83 1 3 5
%tot WIP 5 28 67
84 1 6 2
%tot WIP 6 64 30
85 1 5 3
%tot WIP 4 46 50
86 1 5 4 2
%tot WIP 4 48 48
Source: NAVFAC CMS data base
WIP in constant FY S6 S, millions
diseconomy of scale occurs, which essentially means that the organization has become
so large management cannot effectively control it. From outward appearances, then.
WESTDIV should experience greater economy of scale than the other EFDs.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving. In fact, WESTDIV has grown so large, and
its activities are so dispersed, that senior management at WESTDIV argue that their
EFD is experiencing diseconomy of scale. A feasibility study is now underway to
consider dividing WESTDIV into three EFDs. Given the disparity in sizes of EFDs (in
terms of manpower and workload), economy of scale is potentially a major factor in
staffing. The question is, how can it be measured? A related question is. how to isolate
the measurement of economy of scale from the numerous other factors that affect an
EFDs staffing and work output? Tables 7 and 8 present interesting information
regarding this area. Table 7 shows, by EFD for FY 84-86, design-in-place, Design
Division work-years expended in performing the DIP. and the DIP, WY ratio, which is
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a rough measure of productivity (the amount of DIP per one work-year of effort). This
Table shows that WESTDIV, which had a substantially larger Design Division than
the other EFDs, had greater "productivity" during the three years surveyed. In FY 84 it
produced S5.26 million DIP for each Design Division work-year expended, compared
to less than half that for CHESDIV. However, SOUTHDIV, which had the next
largest Design Division, had the second highest "productivity" for two years, but was
significantly lower in the third. As previously explained, however, raw DIP numbers
are are not completely accurate measures of 04 output. Therefore, this table is
considered a general indicator of productivity.
Results of a similar analysis are shown in Table 8, which relates WIP to EFD
staffing. A possible interpretation of this table is the larger the EFD stalling, the more
"productive" it is.
Although Tables 7 and 8 are presented primarily for informational purposes a
cautious conclusion from these tables is that economy of scale is a factor to be
considered in manpower staffing. To what exieni it should be considered will be
addressed in Chapter IV.
Interestingly, climate is also a factor in stalling. NORTHDIV, which has a
concentration of offices in the New England and Great Lakes areas, and WESTDIV,
with offices in the Pacific Northwest and Adak, Alaska, must contend with adverse
weather conditions during at least a third of the year. Climate has the effect of
restricting the times of the year when construction can be accomplished. Thus. ROICC
offices in Gulfport, Mississippi, and Brunswick, Maine, may perform similar amounts
of WIP and each administer similar numbers of contracts, but because of climate,
ROICC Gulfport may have these projects spread over an entire year, whereas ROICC
Brunswick may have this work concentrated during the summer months, thus requiring
more personnel to administer the contracts.
Experience level/turnover of personnel is really a by-product of the first two
factors discussed-dispersiongeography and demographics, area costs. Simply put, the
greater the experience level of an office or Division, the greater the productivity.
Statistics gathered indicate that at the headquarters level WESTDIV experienced the
highest level of turnover in the Acquisition Organization with a turnover rate averaging
more than 20% over the past three years. SOUTHDIV, with the lowest, had less than
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CD 123 53 2. 4 161 54 3. 149 51 2. 9
ND 251 82 3. 295 82 3. 2 268 83 3. :s
SD 373 102 3. 7 319 96 3. 3 261 96 2. 7
WD 881 168 5. 3 603 171 3. 6 661 172 3. i
Design -In-Place (DIP) in constant FY 86 S, milli 3ns
Source : NAVFAC IPMS and CMS data base systems
TABLE 8
WORK-IN-PLACE AND EFD WORK-YEAR DATA
FY 84 FY 85 FY 86
EFD WIP WY WIP/WY WIP WY WIP/WY WIP WY WI P/WY
CD 107 247 . 43 128 260 . 50 135 278 . 48
ND 183 430 . 43 207 450 . 46 214 430 . 50
SD 212 385 . 55 241 420 . 57 286 439 . 65
WD 467 690 . 68 519 740 . 70 508 896 . 56
WIP in constant FY 79 S, millions (EFD WIP only)
Source: NAVFAC IPMS and CMS data base systems
The mixture of an EFDs' total WIP by fund source is an indicator of workload
complexity and administrative difficulty for an EFD. It is also why "raw" WIP data
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does not tell the "true" story of an EFD's workload and why Table S is only a general
indicator of EFD productivity. New start MILCON projects require less
administration effort per dollar of WIP than O&M funded Real Property Maintenance
(RPM) projects. Because RPM projects outnumber MILCON projects by nearly five
to one, but comprise less than 30% of an EFD's WIP, it is much less time consuming
to administer one dollar of MILCON WIP, which may equate to just one project, than
it is to administer one dollar of O&M Real Property Maintenance WIP, which may be
the result of five projects. Put another way, one man-hour of RPM effort generates
less WIP than one man-hour of MILCON WIP. If the reasoning is not apparent,
consider the paperwork workload alone in administering, per WIP dollar, five times as
many RPM projects as MILCON projects. Statistics for FY 84-86 show that, per total
WIP by EFD, SOLTHDIV had highest percentage of MILCON WIP and,
interestingly enough, the highest percentage of O&M funded RPM and Facility
Support WIP. As will be shown in the next chapter, through statistical analysis, WIP
fund source will be developed into the "best" indicator of work effort for an EFD.
Two terms must be introduced at this point to facilitate understanding of
NAVFAC's manpower budgeting system. Among the various means of classifying
work-in-place (WIP), one method is to distinguish between Income Bearing WIP and
yon-Income Bearing WIP. Income bearing WIP includes MILCON, which comprises
approximately 60% of the total, Industrial Fund, Reimbursables and Family Housing
(can also be considered MILCON). For these fund sources of WIP NAVFAC receives
a percentage fee called SIOH (Supervision, Inspection and Overhead) for administering
the project. This percentage fee varies from 3%-6% of the construction value of the
project, depending on the WIP fund source, and is "paid" either by Congress (for
MILCON) or by the customer (Major Claimant) for whom NAVFAC is administering
the project. NAVFAC receives no fee for non-income bearing WIP, which consists of
O&M funded RPM and Facility Support Contracts.
WIP can also be classified by fund source. There are eight primary WIP fund
sources:
1. Real Property Maintenance WIP consists of minor construction work funded
by O&M funds.
2. Naval Industrial Fund (NTF).
3. Family Housing WIP includes all major and minor repair work and
maintenance service work.
4. Other Direct Costs (ODC) including civil work and RDT&E, represent locally
accepted work at the EFD; ROICC level, performed for a non-Navy activity,




7. Facility Support Contracts (non-income bearing). Commonly called FAC 0%.
S. Facility Support Contracts (income bearing). Commonly called FAC 3%.
NAVFAC, which formerly went by the title "Bureau of Yards and Docks," has
been in the facility acquisition business for over 50 years. Yet. during this time the
development of a comprehensive indicator of the quality of the facility acquisition
process, or even one primary aspect of it, has eluded Navy managers. The following
paragraphs address quality of facility acquisition and its affect on manpower staffing.
At first thought, one might think that the quality of a construction project
(the culmination of the acquisition process) might be as easily measured as. say, the
quality of a car. Unfortunately, it is not so simple. To begin with, facilities have much
longer useful lives than cars. While statistics could be gathered showing how many
Ford Escorts that were sold in 1975 are still on the road today, accurate statistics
regarding shore facilities are either not available or are not meaningful. For example,
many facilities built during WW II were intended for temporary use. The fact that they
were torn down within 10 years or are still in existence today (and many still are; one
need only visit Fort Ord, or Pearl Harbor, to verify this) does not necessarily attest to
their quality. More likely, it is testimony to the limited funding the military- allocates to
the acquisition of new facilities.
The need for facility maintenance or repair might also be considered an
indicator of quality. Yet statistics in this area are even less available, or no more
reliable an indicator of quality than those for life span. The Navy still has a sizeable
inventory of "temporary" facilities that have been put to "permanent" use. These
facilities have certainly required substantial maintenance and repair that would
influence any EFDs' data base. Then there are newer facilities. The problem with any
maintenance statistic on these are the numerous factors that might contribute to it.
including a more-than-likely sizeable lag period between the time the facility was built
and the time maintenance was needed. For example, consider a repair to an air
conditioning system for a building one year after construction was completed. Was the
repair necessitated because of faulty work done by the contractor who installed it, and
thus indicative of inadequate ROICC inspection efforts? Or was it caused by poor
quality manufacturing, in which case the government could really not have detected the
problem? Or maybe it was caused by the Architect-Engineer specifying the wrong type
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of unit or inadvertently undersizing the system, thus causing it to overwork in handling
the cooling load and accelerating deterioration. In such a case, the Design Division
might be responsible for such a fault. Or, maybe the unit was deliberately undersized
because funding was scarce and the facility had to be built with at least some air
conditioning. This line of argument could easily be continued and data base of this
information expanded out of proportion to any benefits received.
One possible measure of quality is an EFD's change order rate. A change
order (in the context of this section) is a change to an original construction contract.
XAVFAC maintains an extensive data base on change orders, cataloging change orders
into more than 20 different categories, ranging from "customer requested," to unforseen
site conditions, to design errors. The latter is potentially indicative of the quality of
effort of not only the Design Division but the ROICC staff as well. A change order
due to design fault can have numerous causes. Some examples are: A dimension on the
structural drawings may not coincide with that on the architectural drawings. Thus, a
contractor may have built according to the architectural drawings, and a change may
need to be made in locating a wall or column; the designer may have neglected to
specify a vapor barrier for the concrete foundation and a change order must be
negotiated with the contractor to install a vapor barrier. Theoretically, diligent review
of the plans and specifications by the Design Division, and later the ROICC staff in
the field, should catch these problems before a contract is awarded. The reason
attempts are made to avoid change orders is that the contractor is no longer competing
against other bidders in pricing these changes; instead, he is negotiating the price, with
a great deal of leverage on his side. In reality, a detailed review of the plans and
specifications—primarily prepared by an outside Architect-Engineer-by the Design
Division and the ROICC is very time consuming and not all errors are easily caught.
However, the change order rate due to design error can be considered a measure of the
quality of effort by 04, and to a lesser extent, the ROICC staff.
Taking this possible measure of quality one step further and assessing its
effects on manpower staffing, in order to support the argument that an an EFD or a
particular Division is understaffed, a manager might be able to say, "We are producing
as much WIP as the other EFDs, but we are having to do it with less people, and this
is showing up in the quality of our work; therefore, we need more people." An attempt
to create such a scenario is reflected in Table 9, which is to be read in conjunction with
Table 7. The two columns for each fiscal year show design-in-place per Design Division
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work-year, a rough measure of output per labor effort, and percent value of change
orders due to faulty design. Theoretically, the larger DIP/WY ratio, which might he a
rough indicator that an EFD was understaffed and having to produce too much DIP
for the staffing level (it also might indicate economy of scale, as previously shown), the
larger the percent change order value due to faulty design. Unfortunately, only a small
sample ofdata—FY S4 and FY 85—was available. In FY 84 one might argue that this
hypothesis was true because WESTDIV, with the highest DIP, WY ratio, also had the
highest percent change order value. However, FY 85 data fails to corroborate this
hypothesis.
TABLE 9
DESIGN-IN-PLACE AND CHANGE ORDER DATA
FY 84 FY 85
EFD DIP/WY c/o% DIP/WY c/o%
CD 2. 38 2. 06 3. 03 3. 04
ND 3. 03 2. 41 3. 22 1. 98
SD 3. 7 1. 7 3. 33 1. 68
WD 5. 26 3. 2 3. 57 2. 3
DIP in constant FY 86 S. millions
Change order percentage = SValue of CO divided by Total Contract Value
Source: FACSO report on EFD Change Orders
Continuing with the effects of "quality" on staffing, NAVFAC does evaluate,
or compare, EFD facility acquisition performance through a system of Management by
Objectives, which is embodied in the OP-Plan. As stated in NAVFAC Instruction
5220.11, Goal Progress Reporting System:
The fulcrum of NAVFACENGCOYI management is embodied in the
Operating Plan, which sets forth the Command's programs, functions, and goals,
together with the plan for the allocation of all Command resources for a "given
fiscal year.
One of the essential ingredients to the proper management of anv enterprise
is the ability to objective^' and accurately identify, in a timely manner, the
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success being achieved in furtherance of the stated goals of the organization. This
is the purpose of the Goal Progress Reporting System (GPRS).
Thus, the Operating Plan forms the basis for GPRS bv identifying the
functions to.be performed during the fiscal year and establishing specific'goals to
be achieved in each functional area.
The GPRS provides for a semi-annual Goal^ Progress Report as to the status
of progress made toward the achievement of all "the goals set forth in the
Operating Plan . . . Program Managers have defined for "each function onlv the
goals which are new initiatives for the rear and support the attainment of
program objectives. [Ref. 14: p. 5]
One of the problems in comparing EFD performance through the GPRS is
that OP-Plan goals for Program IV are largely quantitative, such as goals for the
amount of WTP and DIP. Quality of facility acquisition is still a very elusive concept.
Moreover, because there are multiple goals for Program IV, there is an inherent
drawback to evaluating an EFD's performance, as well as use and needs of resources,
through the GPRS. As stated by W. F. Ridgway in his article, Dysfunctional
Consequences of Performance Measurement:
The mounting interest in and application of tools . . . foster the idea that if
progress toward goals can be measured, efforts and resources can be more
rationally managed ....
Quantitative measures of performance are tools, and are undoubtedly useful.
But research indicates that indiscriminate use and undue confidence and' reliance
in them result from insufficient knowledge of the full effects and consequences.
Judicious use of a tool requires awareness of possible side effects and reactions.
The use of multiple criteria (of performance measurement) assumes that the
individual will commit his or the organization's efforts, attention, and resources
in greater measure to those activities which promise to contribute the greatest
improvement to overall performance ....
Without a single overall composite measure of performance, the individual is
forced to rely upon his judgement as to whether increased effort on one criterion
improves overall performance, or whether there mav be a reduction in
performance on some other criterion which will outweigh the increase in the first.
Ref. 15: pp. 240-246][1
Interviews with NAVFAC personnel indicated that progress in meeting OP-
Plan goals is not used in determining future allocation of resources to the EFDs for
virtually the reasons described in Ridgway's article. If an EFD Commander determines
the need to increase DIP because projects are backlogged at this stage, or he decides
the Design Division is handicapped by a shortage of experienced personnel, he may
allocate proportionately greater resources to this Division, regardless of the effect on
achieving Op-Plan goals in other Divisional areas.
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In subsection A. 2. a of this chapter, the question of where an EFD
Commander can receive the greatest "marginal return" on his labor investment was
raised. Interviews with EFD personnel indicated several schools of thought on this
subject. The two prime considerations in answering this question were: Where do
bottlenecks occur in the facilities acquisition process, and what Division can best
improve the quality of the end product-the actual facility—with the addition of one
more work-year of labor? Or, conversely, given that an EFD does not obtain the
work-year allocation requested, from what Division can he reduce the allocation to
receive the least "marginal reduction" in overall performance? Addressing the first
consideration, an informal survey revealed that bottlenecks of equal severity can occur
at any point in the facilities acquisition process to delay final completion of a
construction project. For example, the Contracts Division could be late in awarding an
A-E contract to commence design of the project; the Design Division could delay the
actual design work; or, once the construction contract was awarded and under the
responsibility of the ROICC, construction could be delayed because the ROICC was
late in approving shop drawings or in approving a change order. Apparently no help
for the EFD Commander there. The concept of marginal return on quality provoked
different responses. The general consensus-although there were dissenters-indicated
that the Design Division or Project Management Division had the greatest effect on
quality of the finished product. General reasoning was that once a design is completed,
and done well, it is a straightforward matter for the construction contractor to build
the facility because he has "quality" plans and specifications, and the job of the
ROICC is made easier because there are fewer disputes with the contractor over
interpretations of the contract documents and fewer change orders due to faulty design
needing to be negotiated. The unusual part of these responses was that there was no
consistent definition of design quality. Responses ranged from designs that produced
"fewest change orders," to "best 'workmanship'," to "satisfied customers." Liberal
interpretation of these comments indicates these are areas that any Acquisition
Organization Division can influence, and in many projects all three do not coincide.
For example, quality workmanship does not necessarily mean fewer change orders.
Additionally, the Construction Division ROICC Offices are the staff closest to the
actual project and their efforts in contract administration and design review can
certainly produce a "satisfied" customer, can enforce quality workmanship, and can
produce fewer change orders. The Contracts Division, while not as intimately involved
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in the actual project construction, is involved with the selection of the project designer,
assists in the interpretation and enforcement of contract provisions, and participates in
the negotiation of change orders. All of this contributes to acquisition quality,
attributed by some just to the Design or Project Management Divisions.
In conclusion, it is considered most difficult to answer the question, "Where
can an EFD Commander receive the best marginal return for his labor effort?", and no
means exist for using any "quality" indicators as the impetus for changes in manpower
staffing, because there is no concrete definition of quality.
The visibility of a project may play more of a role in staffing the field offices
than EFD-level stalling, but consideration must be given to the position CHESDIV
occupies as the EFD serving the top echelon of the Federal Government and the
Military. CHESDIV is responsible for facilities acquisition in the Washington, DC,
area, and the "visibility buck" stops there. Staffing "considerations" are provided to
CHESDIV for this responsibility.
Three of the COXUS EFDs have unique missions in Program IV. These
taskings use Program IV resources but do not contribute to the standard output of
WIP or DIP. The graphs and tables in this thesis that incorporate Program IV
resources (work-years) exclude the resources used in executing these unique taskings.
These are:
• NORTHDIV: administers XAVFAC's Weight Handling Equipment Program.
• CHESDIV: administers the Ocean Facilities Program
• WESTDIV: oversees the ROICC Pacific Division, which provides construction
support to PACDIV.
These taskings require less than 10% of the respective EFDs' Acquisition
Organization resources and are staffed "automatically" by NAVFAC. They are
mentioned here because in several articles previously written on NAVFAC Program IV
staffing, statistics comparing the EFDs did not take into account these special
missions.
2. ROICC/Project Level
Most or all of the same factors that influence staffing at the EFD level affect
ROICC Office staffing. In fact, there is a large overlap. There are, however, additional
factors peculiar to ROICC Offices and projects:
• Project complexity (high technology);
• "Personalities" in an office;
• Securitv considerations, such as construction of the Trident facilities;
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Size of area served by a ROICC Office;
Age of installations served by a ROICC Office;
Reputation Capabilities of contractors in an area, or performing a specific job;
Experience level capabilities of ROICC personnel;
Capabilities; experience of Architect-Engineer who designed a particular project;
"Visibility" of a project;
Reputation rank of the Commanding Officer whose Naval Base is served by a
particular ROICC Office.
Interviews indicated that each of these factors is assessed when staffing a
ROICC Office. Considering that ROICC staff comprises nearly 60% of the Acquisition
Organization, and approximately one-third of an EFD's personnel, the manager for
Program IV needs all the help he can get when making the resource allocation decision.
E. SUMMARY
In Chapter I it was stated that manpower staffing is not an exact science. For
NAVFAC many reasons have been presented in this chapter. The Program managers
at NAVFAC and the EFDs must have some logical and sound means of addressing the
question: "How many people do we need?" From outward appearances, this chapter
may have only served to complicate matters further. The next chapter describes some
of the textbook solutions to manpower staffing and assesses the practicality of
NAVFAC's adopting some of these solutions for its own use.
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III. METHODOLOGY OF DEMAND FORECASTING
A. INTRODUCTION
Scene: Board meeting at the Acme Construction Company
George Slone (Chairman and Chief executive): Exhibit A is our planned budget
and our objective for next year. I'd appreciate your comments.
Martha Kemp (outside director): George, I note that overall you are projecting a
modest amount of growth for next year. You also have had a series of increased
worker productivity projects going to cut employee costs. Things like word processing
stations in all work centers, access to sophisticated data processing systems, computer
aided design, and better contract inspection procedures. I also know that on our
government contracts we've had to adhere more strictly to the MilSpecs, and the paper
work to comply with the new Federal Acquisition Regulations has tripled. Just how
many people will you employ next year to reach your sales and profit objectives?
George: That's a good question, Martha. I don't know exactly. John, what's the
answer?
John Que (Vice President, Personnel): That's hard to say. It depends on lots of
factors.
Vlartha: Frankly, John, that's not much of an answer. I can look at the figures in
this exhibit and see how much money we need. The marketing people tell me how
many units they are going to sell. Why can't you tell me how many people we'll need
to get the job done--our people-cost figure?
John could have answered Martha's question if Acme's personnel department
had developed an effective manpower demand forecasting system.
The above scenario might be repeated numerous times at board meetings all over
America. In the private sector, where budgets are more flexible and hiring practices less
rigid than the public sector, the absence of certainty in the business climate compared
to say, the DoD budget, lessens the requirement for strict accuracy in the manpower
forecasting svstem.
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NAVFAC enjoys no such flexibility luxuries when dealing with
competing for manpower resources through the POM process and in the
Additionally, this flexibility is further lessened when considering the types
needed for Programs IV and IX. These are primarily professional engi.
tradespeople, and Contract Specialists. The recruitment and training of people o[ these
skills is much more time consuming than a lesser skilled work force and thus much
longer lead times must be allowed during the hiring process. NAVFAC really must
"live" by its manpower forecasting system, which not only must be accurate in
forecasting "true" needs but also must have a large degree of credibility, be significant.
and be cost-effective [Ref. 2: p. 853].
1. Criteria for a Good Manpower Forecast
The need for credibility may be intuitively obvious, but the latter two?
Actually, digressing to credibility, the personal credibility of a Civil Engineer Corps
Rear Admiral testifying before Congress may get NAVFAC some mileage, but it is far
safer if it can be explained how the forecast was made, or at least what assumptions
are behind it.
What about a forecast being significant? If forecasts merely confirm what is
intuitively obvious, there is not much value to the forecasting process. The payoff of
forecasting is in identifying the large manpower changes that are in store given changes
in the environment.
Finally, a forecast must be cost-effective. At the NAVFAC level there is not
much chance that a forecast could not be cost-effective. Or is there? In trying to clarify
what the future may hold, it is appealing to keep adding refinements to the forecasting
process. In the macro sense, cost effectiveness implies simplicity. Overly complex
forecasting methods can easily lose credibility, and thus a point of diminishing returns
can be passed when adding forecasting factors to a model. The importance of cost-
effectiveness can be more easily acknowledged in manpower forecasting at the micro,
EFD division level, where the actual cost of a forecast, such as maintaining a data
base, can easily exceed the benefits.
For example, NAVFAC uses an extensive data base system for construction
and resource-use information. While this data base is invaluable to management and
NAVFAC's operation, it is expensive to maintain. Every employee must complete
labor cards indicating cost account code and labor hours used for jobs worked. This
information must then be collated and input into the data base system. A staff of
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Information System specialists writes programs to extract specialized information. The
collective labor hours involved is extensive. At the Division level, if such a data base
system were not in place, or the NAVFAC system did not collect information specific
enough for that Division to use in forecasting manpower requirements, the costs
involved in implementing a new system, or customizing the existing, might exceed any
savings gained from improved forecasting accuracy.
2. Chapter Organization
The remainder of this chapter provides a brief background on manpower
planning in the Navy, then continues by describing the techniques of developing a
macro-level demand-forecasting system on the order that NAVFAC requires for the
POM process. Refinements to the macro-level system are then considered for allocating
resources from NAVFAC to the EFD level. Finally, in general terms, techniques are
described for use at the department division level. Further chapters in this thesis draw
on this chapter to evaluate current NAVFAC and EFD systems and to recommend
improvements.
This chapter draws on writings from the Navy and Air Force Manpower
Engineering Programs, as well as several civilian periodicals. While this chapter uses
the NAVFAC organization as an example, the information provided is equally
applicable to any organization, civilian or government.
However, one might wonder why NAVFAC does not adopt a specific system
already in use by another civilian or government agency. NAVFAC does use
established methods, but the uniqueness of its mission precludes direct adoption of
another system. This situation was discussed at some length at the beginning of
Chapter II.
B. MANPOWER PLANNING IN THE NAVY
Manpower planning for the Navy shore establishment falls under the cognizance
of the Deputy CNO for Manpower. Personnel and Training. The Navy Directive that
controls the manpower planning process is the Navy's Manual of Navy Total Force
Manpower, Policies and Procedures. One of the primary purposes of this manual is "to
provide tasking for the effective determination of manpower requirements and the
effective management of authorized manpower resources." [Ref. 12: p. 1-2]
Theoretically, the Navy's Shore billets are determined by SHORSTAMPS (Shore
Requirements, Standards, and Manpower Planning System). As stated in the directive:
76
SHORSTAMPS is an application of proven industrial and management
engineering principles for determining the total manpower requirements lor the
Navy shore establishment. SHORSTAMPS is comprised of the Shore Required
Operational Capability (SHOROC) subsvstem of standard tasking phrases and
the Navy stalling standards subsystem . . .
The SHOROC is a subsvstem of SHORSTAMPS which is used in the
tasking of Navy shore activities through a structured tasking vocabularv.
SHOROC specifies tasks and defines how" much, how long, and how well tasks
will be performed ....
The SHOROC provides a management decision tool for manpower planners
at all levels of command. IRef. 12: p. 2-171
The goal of SHORSTAMPS is three-fold:
Provide stalling standards for functions performed ashore, based on recognized
management and industrial engineering techniques and objective determination
of workload.
• Provide a svstem for the assembly of manpower requirements information at
the various levels above the activity level, to support Navy manpower
requirements during all stages of the PPB process.
• Provide the methodologies and systems to assess present, and forecast future
manpower requirements" [Ref. 12:' p. 2-1]
In reality, SHORSTAMPS has never fulfilled the objectives of its designers, and
its provisions are now less than rigidly enforced. It proved too inflexible, stalling
standards were costly to develop, and many stalling standards that were developed
were of questionable accuracy. Industrial engineering techniques to determine
manpower stalling, which were espoused by SHORSTAMPS, were simply not suitable
for many organizations. SHORSTAMPS is still the Navy's primary tool in manpower
forecasting, but it has been supplemented—and in some cases superceded--by
judgmental and other less scientific methods. Nonetheless, much of the
SHORSTAMPS methods used in developing staffing standards are sound, and this
Chapter refers to these methods often.
C. NAVFAC LEVEL
At the macro level there are two primary methods of manpower forecasting:
trend projection and modeling multi-predictive. Both are called "top down'' methods.
Trend projection develops a forecast based on a past relationship between a factor
related to staffing and stalling itself. For example, in many businesses, sales levels are
related to employment needs, and so the personnel planner can develop a table or
graph showing past relationships between sales and employment. For NAVFAC,
Programs IV and IX staffing levels might be related to projected WIP or number of
contracts awarded. The important requirement that this factor must fulfill is that it be
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causally related to manpower needs: A change in the volume of this factor must change
the manpower input requirements. [Ref. 3: p. Ill]
Modeling and multi-predictive techniques are the most sophisticated. While
trend projections are based on relating a single factor to staffing, the more advanced
projections relate many factors-such as WIP, number of contract awards, number of
active contracts, and projected value of design- to stalling. The major criterion to use
in the selection of output units to measure (i.e. WIP, sales dollars, number of
customers served, etc.) is that to increase the production of these outputs there must be
a corresponding increase in the number ol~ input units (i.e. labor). As stated by Bruce
Coleman in his article, An Integrated System for Manpower Planning:
For an organization which sells its, output, the dollar value of its goods and
services is an appropriate measure of output. Tor government, educational,
military, and similar institutions, a dollar value for services is not available. For
most activities inside a companVj a dollar value does not exist for production
ellorts, except perhaps where prddt or cost centers exist.
When there is no dollar value to measure output, a phvsical unit of
measurement is u^ed. Vouchers processed or customers served are' typical units.
Determination of appropriate pnvsical output units may be difficult. 1 he unit
selected should respond to changes in labor inputs, and labor requirements
should change as the volume of the output changes. In addition, the relationships
should be useful over time. In other words, the" output selected is not one that
the firm will cease producing in the near future or one that will become onlv a
minor part of its activities. [Ref. 16: p. 90]
Although primary output of EFD Programs IV and IX efforts can be measured
in dollars, such as work-in-place or design-in-place (DIP), these outputs, or workload,
are subject to distortion. The problem with using "raw" WIP data is, as explained in
Chapter II, that this data does not distinguish if one million dollars in WIP represented
one MILCON project or live O&M-funded projects (the actual ratio that these projects
occur). And it is generally much more ettbrt-intensive to administer five eighty-
thousand dollar projects than one four hundred thousand dollar project. Similarly,
"raw" DIP numbers do not "tell the entire story." although not for the same reason as
WIP ("raw" DIP. however, is generally considered more accurate in reflecting
administration effort than "raw" WIP). This is because ISFDs, for the most part, do not
administer small dollar value O&M design work. This is done at the Public Works or
ROICC level. EFD Design Divisions primarily oversee large MILCON design projects.
An example illustrates why DIP value does not translate with complete accuracy into
relative labor effort: It takes more effort to design and oversee a S 10 million road and
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parking lot paving project than a S5 million sophisticated telecommuniq
Thus WIP and DIP alone must be used with caution as causal factors.
Once such possible output, or causal, factors are identified, it is p<
regression analysis to find the "best fit" staffing equation to predict input r
A note of clarification may be in order to explain how WIP and DIP can be
"causal factors" for EFD labor requirements when labor must be in place before WIP
and DIP can be produced. Design workload and construction workload are assigned to
XAVFAC or an EFD and, in turn, NAVFAC EFDs must determine how many people
they need to accomplish this tasking. Thus WIP and DIP, which are assigned taskings,
cause stalling requirements.
1. Limitations
At the macro-level, forecasting methods are largely statistical and look
primarily at the "big picture." Subjective methods such as expert judgment, the Delphi
technique, and bottom-up or segmentation approaches play a lesser role. However,
statistical approaches are not without their limitations. Any purely statistical approach
to forecasting has an inherent bias--a bias in favor of the past [Ref. 17: p. 158], The
statistical analysis tells us what will happen if past patterns and relationships continue
into the future. But is this a reasonable assumption? Numerous situations could occur
to invalidate that assumption:
• Introduction of new methods or equipment could substantially improve
productivity. At NAVFAC the use of computers in design, word processing,
record keeping, and contract processing has exploded over the past ten years.
• Reorganization could phase out some jobs and create others.
• Changes in eovernment regulations, such as implementation of the Federal
Acqursition Regulations, has streamlined the contracting process, while the
outcry over SI 200 coffee makers has made the process much more deliberate.
As stated in an article bv James W. Walker:
Vetter has also noted another serious drawback to most of the computer
based simulation models that have been advanced. If projections are made on the
basis of historical data only, then there is a concealed assumption that the future
is going to be like the past] and the past thus comes to exercise a kind of tvrannv
over the future. When historical data are used exclusively, to be specific, there is
no consideration of what 'ought to be' in staffing the organization, as opposed to
'what has been.' The generaPpoint here is that in forecasting from historical data
alone there is a built-in incapacity to optimize the utilization of human resources.
Hopefully future models will avoid this pitfall. [Ref. 17: p. 158]
To address part of Walker's statement, when forecasting at the macro-level it
may not be realistic to be thinking in terms of what ought to be. That is really to be
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done at the divisional level, a point that will be addressed later in this chapter. Another
means of macro-level forecasting that may be well-suited to addressing an
organization's needs is forecasting by segmentation. The specific methodology of this
process is explained later in this chapter. As stated by Walker:
Organizational segmentation, of course, simplifies the problem bv
foreshortening the need Tor a total forecasting model. Even where the organ-
ization in question is not primarily segmented, projections may thus be improved
by focusing on segments of a work force; more realistic parameters mav be
established"and greater specificity in projections mav be possible. [Ref. 17: p.
156]
It has been proposed that in forecasting for Programs IV and IX requirements
NAVFAC build their request to Congress from the bottom up, simply collating the
requirements generated by the EFD's. At the POM level, however, this method would
be too unwieldy in justifying requirements to Congress. NAVFAC needs an
uncomplicated, understandable (at the Congressional level) system that meets the
criteria stated earlier for an effective manpower forecasting system. Segmentation
would not be persuasive in showing changes in manpower requirements given changes
in workload level. Segmentation may be better used by NAVFAC in allocating
resources to the EFDs, and, in fact, it is used by NAVFAC to some extent.
D. VALUE OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
At the macro level it is apparent that purely statistical methods are inherently
limited by a bias towards the past. They are also limited in that one-time events or
special factors are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in a regression equation. The
public outcry over the excessive prices paid for spare parts is an example. Within
months of this crisis, the EFD Code 02 (Contract) Divisions saw their staffing double
or even triple in order to provide improved contract support. Does this limitation
invalidate the use of statistical analysis for forecasting? In a word, no. It has been
suggested that the use of statistical analysis does not rule out the exercise of expert
judgment and experience; rather this type of analyses enables judgment and experience
to focus on those parts of the problem that are properly matters for judgment and
experience. As stated by Richard Fantzreb:
Analysis illuminates the problem and mav provide hard answers to part of
the problem. Ultimately, however, the decision maker must come to grips with
those factors which are unknown or uncertain but about which professional
experience of judgment is sometimes helpful. Without the preliminary analysis
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few decision makers would know which particular facet of the problem was
deserving of their professional judgment. Analysis thus becomes the handmaiden
of judgement-not its antithesis. [Rcf. 2: p. 853]
E. EFD LEVEL
At the second echelon of NAVFAC's manpower budgeting process, that of
allocating resources among the EFDs, statistical methods such as modeling are still the
primary tool, but judgment and additional modeling factors, such as number and types
of activities served, must be included to account for the unique aspects of each EFD.
The model may have to become more complex in terms of number of predictive
variables, which may require an expanded data base. Many of the unique
characteristics of an EFD will not be able to be quantified (realistically), such as
experience level of personnel, capabilities of specific contractors, economy of scale of
operations, political considerations, geographical locations, etc. Judgment on the part
of the Program manager thus plays a more important role at this level. It is here the
previous quotation may be particularly apt. As Gareth Stainer says in Manpower
Planning: The Management of Human Resources, "The aim in employing statistical or
other techniques is to simplify the problem to the extent that the human mind can
cope with it efficiently, rather than to eliminate subjective judgment altogether." James
Walker expresses a similar thought: "To estimate future requirements, someone must
make a decision. Mathematical analysis and massive data may be useful, but
ultimately, the determination of 'how should we be staffed' is a human decision."
[Ref. 2: p. 855]
It is interesting to note that the Logistics Management Institute, which is
currently under contract to the Army Corps of Engineers to produce a divisional level
manpower forecasting system, is attempting to quantify the aforementioned "unique
characteristics." This development will be discussed further in Chapter IV.
F. DIVISION LEVEL FORECASTING
In budgeting at the division level, that is, allocating Program resources among
the 02, 05, 04, and 09A2 divisions, the process can be refined-and made more
complicated-easily by an order of magnitude. All the techniques applicable at the
macro and second-echelon levels are applicable at the divisional level, but there is a
significant refinement of subjective methods to include "expert estimate" and Delphi
techniques. The former method involves an "expert" forecasting the manpower needs
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based on experience and intuition. The Delphi technique involves repeated interactions
of subjective, written estimates by a number of managers obtained by questionnaire
and administered and collected anonymously. When information is collected, it is
summarized and redistributed to participants for consideration of the reasoning behind
all the individual estimates. The cycle is repeated until an agreement is reached. The
keys to this technique are precise problem definition, questioning and feedback.
[Ref. 3: pp. 111-112]
The case for subjective forecasts may sound like a tenuous one. It may actually
sound as though we are giving up trying to forecast and just asking people to guess
about manpower requirements. Generally, this will not be the case. As stated by
Richard Fantzreb:
Reiving on the subjective judgment of individuals does not mean that the
process oF elfciting that judgment will be without guidance, without motivation to
take the task seriouslv, or without controls over the qualitv of the result.
Judgemental forecasting can be done poorlv, or it can be done 'well. [Ref. 2: p.
S55f
There is at least one caveat with subjective methods. At the division or unit
level, subjective methods are useful, but they must be tempered with the awareness that
a manager may not be careful to distinguish between "need to have" and "nice to
have," or not really be able to distinguish between the two. As trend analysis has a
built-in bias towards the past because it uses past data and past circumstances to
predict future requirements in which circumstances may have changed, an overstafling
situation may easily be perpetuated by subjective methods, as well. How, then, can
this situation be addressed?
G. WORK MEASUREMENT AND THE MOST-EFFICIENT-ORGANIZATION
CONCEPT
Most organizations are naturally dynamic and thus do not enjoy a status quo.
Therefore, every organization, no matter how large or small, needs to be examined
periodically in a cold, objective light to determine whether it has grown fat with
unnecessary work, which adds little to the primary effort, and to see if personnel are
being properly utilized and numbers of people to do the work are neither too high nor
too low. How to do? By a combination of management analysis, industrial engineering
techniques, and statistical applications. [Ref. 18: p. 15]
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The goal through this section is. quite simply, to determine if manpower is
efficiently and effectively used and, if so, develop manpower standards to develop the
most valid work-center man-hour-to-workload relationship possible to predict or
estimate manpower needs. The determination of efficiency effectiveness involves the
concept of Most Efficient Organization (MEO). Many people may be familiar with
MEO from the implementation of OMB Circular A-76, the Commercial Activities
program. Under A-76, the Government has been required to compete with private
enterprise for performance of certain services, such as public works functions,
Automated Data Processing services, etc. To successfully compete in the marketplace,
government organizations had to come up with MEOs, or the smallest-staffed
organization to perform the assigned mission. The profit motive has required civilian
organizations to operate "lean and mean" (or more so than government organizations)
simply to survive in a competitive world. Heretofore, the government had operated
under no such constraints, and most government managers had no idea how to get
their organizations in to "fighting trim." Thus, there has been recent emphasis on
educating government managers in developing MEOs.
To arrive at a MEO a process called an Efficiency Review (ER) is performed. In
an ER. potential efficiencies are sought to streamline the organization and its work
processes. To arrive at a MEO, which is a pre-requisite for determining an accurate
manpower standard, a step-by-step, almost cookbook process is performed. This
process is outlined in the following paragraph and then briefly described.
1. Perform Activity Overview
2. Perform Organizational Analysis
3. Perform System Process Charting
4. Identify Workload Indicators
5. Identify Potential Efficiencies
Performing an Activity Overview involves determining mission and tasking,
reviewing activity instructions, identifying interrelationships with other activities, and
reviewing historical data such as resources expended and outputs produced. Historical
trends may not provide conclusions but, rather, information which may point to
possible efficiencies. For example, if the number of contracts acts awarded has fallen
25% over a period, but manning in the contracts office has remained stable, a potential
efficiency has been identified.
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The next step is to perform an Organizational Analysis by reviewing the current
organization charts and tasks as shown in the organization manual and activity
instructions. Examining the charts can determine if there are any possible efficiencies to
be gained by restructuring the organization. Organizational areas that give rise to
possible efficiencies include:
Fragmentation, i.e.. multiple units of minimal size;
Multiple levels that limit delegation of authority and restrict information flow;
Duplicate functions;
• Excessive overhead.
The structure of an organization should aim for:
• The smallest number of organizational units and levels feasible;
A minimum ratio of supervisors to nonsupervisorv personnel to maintain span
of control;
• Deputy and assistant stalT positions only when essential.
The next step is to perform System Process Charting, which portrays the
interrelationships of man. material, and paper work within the organization. Only the
more lucrative systems, in terms of potential savings, should be charted. Analysis of the
current system can lead to the identification of many possible efficiencies:
• Duplication of effort;
• Generation of reports that are not used;
• Lack of set procedures to handle frequently occurring exceptions;
• Unnecessary procedural steps.
One of the most important steps is the identification of Workload Indicators.
Analysis of Workload Indicators is essential in determining a work
center's/organization's output in relation to input. Workload Indicators explain what
drives the man-hours expended in the performance of assigned tasking. Examples of
Workload Indicators might be number of contracts awarded, number of projects
designed, etc. Workload Indicators provide a basis for:
• Supporting manpower aspects of the budget.
• Planning and assigning work.
• Reviewing workload forecasts and manpower use.
• Measuring the efficiency of the organization.
• Developing stalling equations.
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There now exists a complete description of the organization's scope, work
performed, and input and output factors.
The most important step, step 5, is the identification of Potential Efficiencies.
This is really a culmination of the previous steps. There are many types of problems
that create the opportunity for method improvement and increased efficiency. Clues
can be derived from information collected. In particular, analysis of System Process
Charts, Organizational Analysis, etc. An excellent method is expert observation of the
organization. Sometimes a potential efficiency can be identified simply because a
problem is seen happening once, and then research is done to confirm that it happens
frequently.
Included in this step is the sometimes difficult, but necessary task of quantifying
the man-hour impact when an improvement, identified from a potential efficiency, is
implemented. This task is necessary to identify the "true" time or effort required in the
production of historical output. This result will be used in determining the staffing
standard equation.
Once the MEO is developed the manager can proceed to the last step.
1. Developing the Manpower Standard
The objective of the manpower-standards-development process is to determine
an organization's/work center's man-hour-to-workload relationship and quantify
manpower requirements. Simply, manpower standards relate manpower requirements
to workload volume. The Air Force classifies standards into two main types [Ref. 21: p.
4-1]:
• Tvpe I standards are developed bv determining man-hours required to do a job
through the use of standard time data, time study, work sampling, or a
combination of these techniques. The resulting standard reflects time to perform
a given workload. Of the divisions at an EFD, only 02 (contracts) might be
suitable for a Type I standard.
• A standard is characterized as Tvpe II when the work is not appropriate for
engineered methods, or a large, hiinimum staff is required which is to a great
extent, independent of workload in a broad minimum-to-maximum range. I his
characterizes the 09A2 organization in particular, and the 05 ROICCoffices.
Alternate methods must 5e used for forecasting requirements in such cases,
such as using regression analvsis to find the "bestlit" staffing equation based on
established "workload factors and MHO input data, "or forecasting by
segmentation.
There are three phases in the development of a standard: (1) Measurement
Design, (2) Work Measurement and Data Collection, (3) Data Analysis,
Computations, and Model Development. [Ref. 21: pp. 6-8]
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Measurement Design identifies what data are needed and how to measure the
work and collect the data for developing a manpower standard. The major products of
this effort are the identification of Workload Factors and what type of engineering
measurement method to use to measure man-hours required. Workload Factors were
identified during the Efficiency Review phase and are those factors that explain what
drives the man-hours expended by an organization. Essentially, they are those outputs
the volume of which will have a causal effect on the number of input resources
required, i.e.. number of contracts awarded, etc. Care must be taken when identifying
these workload factors. As mentioned earlier. WIP and DIP are two major outputs of
Program Programs IV and IX at EFDs. However, straight values are misleading. The
choice of engineering measurement methods include work sampling, time study, etc.
The Work Measurement and Data Collection phase is as its name implies.
The Data Analysis and Computation phase uses statistical methods to develop
regression equations that best fit the data. In work centers such as 02 that have types
of work that are suited to time-study techniques, labor hours taken to produce each
output are measured. Then, given a projected volume of workload, the labor hours per
output are multiplied by the projected output to get total labor hours. Indirect labor is
usually constant within a given range of direct labor and this is just added on to get
total manpower requirements.
Three of the EFD Program IV work centers (04, 05 and 09A2) are not suited
for engineering measurements of required manpower, and even development of a Type
II Division-wide staffing-standard equation is difficult for the 05 ROICC organization
and the Project Management Division. In these Divisions there is a significant fixed
minimum staffing level. Comparing workload factors to labor input for the variable
staffing level is made difficult because the segmented organizational structure of these
Divisions qualifies even a Division-level staffing standard. For example, the
Construction Division may forecast a 10% increase in WIP for the next year. However,
this increase may be dispersed over all the ROICC offices, and each office is able to
handle the increased workload without adding any additional staff. Thus, a 10%
workload realistically may not translate to any additional stalling requirements for 05.
These Divisions are better suited to budgeting by segmentation. A single Division-wide
staffing equation would not be an accurate means of manpower forecasting. The
question is, then, can a mathematical model be developed to facilitate budgeting by
segmentation and to augment purely judgmental forecasting methods? The answer is
yes, and is addressed in Chapter IV.
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2. Section Summary
The preceding section really falls under the category of theoretical or textbook
management. It is interesting to note that the Navy Manpower Engineering Centers,
which were responsible for performing Efficiency Reviews and developing Manpower
Standards under SHORSTAMPS, were disbanded by SECXAV Lehman in October,
1986. Apparently. Secretary Lehman felt that individual organizations were capable of
performing their own Efficiency Reviews to arrive at Most-Efficient-Organizations.
Also, while the Manpower Engineering Centers were still going concerns, the EFDs
were exempted from undergoing Efficiency Reviews and development of a Divisional
staffing standard, precisely because of the scenario just described for 05. Does this type
complication" render useless the performance of an ER or negate the possibility of
developing a staffing standard for these EFD Divisions, or any other organization that
is service-oriented instead of production-oriented? Absolutely not. Two examples will
be cited.
In 1983 the Naval Postgraduate School Public Works Department (PWD)
came under study for the Commercial Activities Program. They were told to develop
and implement a MEO and then compete in the civilian marketplace to perform public-
works services at NPS. Going through a process similar to what has been outlined,
they cut their work force by 30%, primarily by changing from a trades-structured
organization, i.e.. carpentry shop, electrical shop, etc., to a functional organization, i.e..
teams to perform trouble calls, standing job orders, etc. As a result, Public Works' bid
was S-400,000 less than a local contractor's, and personnel at the PWD retained their
jobs. Additionally, a SHORSTAMPS staffing-standard equation was developed using
VIEO labor input data.
Northern Division recently completed a similar management review initiated
to cope with a reduction in staffing and a desire to provide improved services. There,
measures were a bit more drastic as they shifted an entire division from the cognizance
of one department to another. The results, though, have been the same: a reduction in
staffing while maintaining previous levels of service.
Several of the EFDs have found ways to address the problems of developing
staffing standards for their Divisions by using innovative derivatives of the methods
described here. These will be described in Chapter IV.
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H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The average manager might dismiss the methods discussed in this last chapter as
pie-in-the-sky. Who manages by statistics anyway? This attitude may not comfort the
Program IV managers who must allocate resources among their Divisions. Another
consideration is the resource budgeting system NAVFAC used for the first time in FY
87. Previously, resource allocations to the EFDs were "fenced'' by Program. Although
the EFD commanders had some latitude in redistributing these resources among
Programs, this latitude was limited. In FY S7 NAVFAC allocated resources to the
EFDs in one lump sum. leaving it to the EFD commanders to allocate resources
among Programs. This task can be quite intimidating. Personal judgment (seat of the
pants) alone will not suffice.
In summary, it is apparent that the "best" means of manpower demand fore-
casting is a combination of quantitative and subjective methods. As the type of the
forecast changes from determining work center requirements to determining
requirements of an entire command structure, the quantitative and subjective emphases
will change and certain methods may no longer apply, but the general nature of
manpower forecasting remains remarkably constant.
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IV. EVALUATION OF NAVFAC'S CURRENT MANPOWER STAFFING
SYSTEM
Everything should be made as simple as possible, bur not more so.-- Albert Einstein
This chapter brings together information provided in the first three Chapters to
evaluate NAVFAC's manpower staffing system for the facilities acquisition mission.
This system has three primary tiers: budgeting at the POM level, distributing the
manpower resources obtained by NAVFAC from Congress CNO among the EFDs,
and, at the EFD level, distributing Programs IV & IX resources among Divisions (02,
04, 05, 09A2, 09A1. etc.). Because the NAVFAC facilities acquisition process embodied
in Programs IV and IX use nearly 60% of NAVFAC's manpower resources, a separate
and distinct system is used by NAVFAC in forecasting requirements for this mission.
This is in contrast to the remaining NAVFAC EFD Programs which do not each have
a separate forecasting system at the NAVFAC level. This chapter traces the
development of the POM-level staffing system for the acquisition mission. The validity
of this system is evaluated considering the not only the complexities outlined in
previous chapters, but also comments received from the EFDs, comparison with
generally accepted methods of manpower demand forecasting, comparison with
forecasting methods used by the Army Corps of Engineers, and results of a statistical
analysis using current data. This chapter continues with a similar evaluation of the
methods NAVFAC uses to allocate resources among EFDs. Recommendations for
improvements will be made in the final chapter.
A. DEVELOPMENT HISTORY OF NAVFAC MANPOWER FORECASTING
SYSTEM
Until 19S0, NAVFAC's method of manpower forecasting was very simplistic, and
it could afford to be. As stated in Chapter II, NAVFAC's WIP efforts can be divided
into two types: income-bearing WIP and non-income-bearing WIP. Prior to the mid
1970s NAVFAC's construction efforts were almost entirely income bearing WIP. In
FY 71 non-income bearing O&M funded RPVI and Facility Support contracting WIP
accounted for less than five percent of total WIP, while MILCON WIP accounted for
more than 60%.H Thus, to budget for manpower, NAVFAC simply estimated the
11 Source: FACSO reports on WIP
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amount of SIOH dollars to he collected from their income bearing W1P (see Chapter
II, section D.l. to become reacquaintcd with SIOH), and, based on overall average
labor cost per work-year, translated this to required numbers of people. The system
generally worked well because the majority of project workload was MILCON, and
thus the dollar value of the project reflected (within reasonable accuracy) the overall
relative labor effort required to administer the contract (i.e. a S2 million project
required twice as much effort as a SI million project). Thus, if WESTDIV were
projected to perform twice as much WIP as NORTHDIV, they were allocated twice as
many Program IV work-years (there was virtually no such thing as Program IX WIP
because Facility Support Contracts were still in their infancy). However, from 1974 to
19S0 non-income-bearing WIP jumped from 6 percent of total WIP to more than 20%,
and in 19S5 it comprised 30% of total WIP. A similar increase was experienced in
the numbers of these projects. Additionally, non-income-bearing WIP was not spread
evenly among EFDs for each year. Thus, the unique character (mixture of types of
WIP) of each EFDs workload was not reflected in total WIP, the levels of which had
been used as the guide for manpower budgeting. The consequences of this shift in WIP
composition were that SIOH fees from income-bearing WIP, which previously had
been able to subsidize the administration of non-income bearing WIP, were no longer
able to do so. Additionally, the EFDs which bore the brunt of this increase in non-
income bearing WIP were becoming severly understaffed in relation to "true" workload.
As LT Greg Parker so astutely recognized in his 1976 thesis, which evaluated the
Navy's facility acquisition process and briefly addressed staffing procedures:
In addition, resources tend to be allocated strictlv on the basis of relative
chanecs in program levels (dollar) and not on the basis of the specific
requirements of each project. As such, the differences in the unique character of
each 1:1 l)s workload are not heme iullv recognized. As a result each 1:1 D's
capabilities and commitments to meet the current set ol' program goals vary.
[Ref. 22: p. 65J
In short, NAVFAC needed a new manpower budgeting system not only at the
POM level, but also to determine allocations among EFDs.
In 1980, NAVFAC in conjunction with the Navy Manpower and Material
Analysis Center (NAVMAC) developed a POM-level manpower staffing standard for
the facilities acquisition mission. Much of the thrust of their efforts went into
12 Source: FACSO
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determining Workload Factors, which are those factors (discussed in Chapter III) that
have a causal effect on manpower stalling. As stated by Mike Galgano. one oi" the
developers of the staffing standard:
The ideal situation would be the capacity of measuring each individual's
time asainst each facility and contract. The practicality of such an exercise is
futile at best. 1 his tvpe of effort would more than likely take a disproportionate
share of the work force's time (author's note: a forecasting svstem must be cost
effective—Chapter 111). Consequently, a search for viable parameters that would
relate closclv to an actual individual's work effort was necessary. Therefore, a
"model" was' established utilizing available work quantifications. [Ref. 23: p. 2]
As stated in Chapter III, the criteria for a good manpower forecasting model,
especially one that will be used to justify manpower budget requests at the
Congressional level, are that it be credible, be significant, and be cost-effective.
NAVFAC's intent was to develop such a model. Therefore it was seeking to use its
most visible and measurable product--work-in-place--to use as a yardstick to determine
its manpower requirements. However, as previously stated, "raw" WTP is not a good
indicator of administration effort because, per dollar o[ WTP. different types of
projects, particularly O&M funded RPM projects, are more numerous and thus more
administration intensive, than others. Table 10 illustrates the differences in the number
of contract awards by fund source for the CONUS EFDs for FY 86. In unitary terms.
a dollar's worth of MILCON WIP may represent one project, while a dollar's worth of
O&M work may represent ten projects, and it is far easier to administer one contract
worth one dollar than ten contracts each worth ten cents. The solution sought was to
weight the WIP by fund type to incorporate the influence of relative numbers of
projects and to reflect relative administrative effort required to accomplish facility
acquisition.
The result of NAVFAC's research gave rise to three workload parameters that
were not only measurable, but measurable by fund source: (1) Active contract
workdays; (2) Number of active contracts; and (3) Number of active projects. The
definition of these parameters are:
1. Active Contract Workdays are the total number of calendar days between the
contract award date and'the Beneficial Occupancy Date.
2. Active Contracts are anv awarded contracts that has active contract workdays
during the period considered.
3. Active Project is a line item or project whose primary procurement document
either qualifies as an active contract or is in the process of becoming an active
contract (i.e. between design authorization and contract award).
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TABLE 10






MILCON 275 FAC 0% 2055
NIF 1548 FAC 3% 1190
FH 599 RIM 32
RPM 5427 ODC 193
Source: CMS data base
NAVFAC then attempted to relate "effort" to these parameters, and in doing so
made several assumptions. The first assumption was that contract workdays served as a
yardstick to measure the EFD field-type (ROICC) efibrt of inspection and construction
management. The rationale for this assumption was that efibrt required by both the
facility itself and its related contract administration normally occurs throughout the
active life of the contract. The larger and or more complex the facility, the more
contract days involved, indicating more efibrt, while the reverse is true for smaller
items. (Ref. 23: p. 2]
The second assumption was that since efibrt related to contract services is
directly connected with contract-procurement functions, the EFD field and
headquarters efforts supporting this area (Contracts Division personnel at headquarters
and at OICC ROICC Offices) could be measured as a function of the volume of active
contracts [Ref. 23: p. 3]. In an interview with Mr. Galgano, the question was raised as
to why the number of contracts awarded was not a better measure of Contracts Division
efibrt, since active contracts could include contracts awarded in previous fiscal years.
According to Mr. Galgano, active contracts was a better and more realistic measure of
efibrt because the Contracts Division expends efibrt on a contract throughout its
duration, not just during award. This point was emphasized in section Il.C.l.d. of this
thesis.
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Finally, the Project Manager's functions (09A2 or 50) concentrate on overall
projects and phase coordination. The EFD Project Management effort could be
measured by number of projects that this functional area handled and to what degree
these efforts were devoted to the various phases of individual projects [Rcf. 23: p. 3|.
Number of projects differs from number of contracts in that a project, such as
construction of an airfield, can include several contracts, such as construction of the
runway, or construction of the control tower.
By using these three parameters to develop weighted WIP factors it was
determined that, "within an acceptable degree of error," fund source of WIP was an
accurate predictor of administration effort, and thus dollar amounts of WIP weighted
by fund source, in regression analysis, contribute to a stalling standard or model to
forecast resource requirements (the dependent variable) for the acquisition mission.
[Rcf. 24j
The question arises as to the validity of the assumption that weighted WIP is the
best workload factor to predict manpower requirements. Two avenues are explored in
answering this question. The first is a comparison with the method used by the Army
Corps of Engineers. The second draws upon manpower stalling theory discussed in the
previous chapter.
Although a more in-depth discussion of the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE)
recently developed manpower stalling standard follows later in this Chapter, it is
appropriate to address their findings on this matter. ACE embarked on a completely
independent study in 1985 to develop a stalling standard for their acquisition mission
for much the same reasons NAVFAC did in 1979: The nature of their WIP had
changed from primarily MILCON to a more evenly dispersed mixture of WIP fund
sources, and their former system of manpower budgeting by SIOH rates was no longer
adequate. In a preliminary study ACE attempted to relate administration effort to a
project's facility category code. Thus, by knowing the category codes of projects to
be constructed during the upcoming year, the administration cflbrt (work-years)
required for each category code, based on historical data, could be summed over all the
projects, thus arriving at a total manpower requirement. An example illustrates the
reasoning: The acquisition of communications facilities, one category code, is more
complex to administer than, say, warehouses, another category code, because, for the
Each shore facilitv has a four-digit catctzorv code identifier, with classes of
buildincs such as warehouses, administration buildings, hospitals, etc. having the same
first-two numbers.
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communications facilities, there is less margin for error in workmanship resulting in
more thorough inspection efforts by R01CC, and the design process must be more
exact, resulting in greater oversight efforts by the Design Division. If. somehow, the
relative value of administration effort per category code could be determined, this
would be an ideal workload factor.
There were, however, major drawbacks to this method that precluded its use. For
one. data base records were not substantial enough to accurately assign relative
weights of difficulty by category code. Secondly, nearly 60% of ACE workload (like
NAVFAC's) was non-MILCON, and the category codes of these future projects was
almost completely unpredictable. What was predictable, and determined to be
sufficiently accurate to discriminate relative effort, was WIP fund source, and this is
used as a workload indicator in the new ACE forecasting model. In a sense, then,
NAVFAC's original decision to use project fund source as a relative measure of effort
was seconded by ACE in a separate study six years later. [Ref. 25]
From a textbook point-of-view, using WIP weighted by fund source follows
established macro-level forecasting methods. The most accurate method is to use
multiple regression analysis to arrive at a stalling standard, using several workload
variables as predictors of labor requirements. To arrive at weighted WIP factors,
several other primary workload factors are involved, such as number of projects, and
duration of projects. In the true sense, then, by using weighted WIP, more than one
variable is being used to forecast manpower requirements.
In developing NAVFAC's staffing standard in 1980. which is used today, two
major data criteria decisions were made. Firstly, NAVFAC used only six months'
worth of data-the first half of FY 79--to develop their weighted factors. The reasoning
behind this decision was:
The parameters selected must be measured over a finite time period that
contains the best and most current quantifiable information available. 1 he
timeframe encompassed by 01 October 78 and 31 March 79 was selected because:
• Prior fiscal vears are purged of completed locally accepted and station
awarded wofkload. Hence, the Construction Management System (CMS)
would not provide a meaningful measurement of workload parameters.
• Bv the end oC the second quarter, support costs begin to level off in relation
to both labor and total costs, furthermore, for analvtical purposes and
comparisons, conclusions from such an anahsis can be straight-lined to draw
final year conclusion that will be within tolerable accuracy.
• The duration is sufficient to absorb any workload irregularities in arriving at
a "typical'' workload picture.
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• The period contains the most accurate measurements oi~ work, efforts and
costs that depict current performance levels. [Ref. 23: pp. 4-5]
The second criteria decision was that the model would be used to develop a
stalling standard for all Acquisition Organization Divisions except the Design Division,
Code ()4. The reasoning was that this model would only assess efforts for construction
management and administration, not design. Later, however, after the weighted WIP
values had been developed as workload factors, regression analysis showed that these
were accurate predictors of 04 requirements as well as the construction management
and administration requirements, and thus 04 was incorporated in the final
SHORSTAMPS model. [Ref. 26]
The reader may have already recognized a potentially significant "problem" with
the first criteria decision: Data from only one fiscal year was used in developing this
standard. Addressing this decision, there is the obvious questioning of the
representation of just one year's data. The NAVFAC acquisition process and the types
of work that NAVFAC performs have undergone significant changes since 1979. The
contracting process has become much more deliberate. More stringent contracting
regulations are in effect, more thorough contract documentation is required, and an
increase in the frequency of management inspections of contracting oflices has
occurred. The types of work that NAVFAC performs in the area of facilities
acquisition now includes a greater proportion of Facilities Support Contracts, which
are very labor intensive to administer. Additionally, the FFDs have been "down
loading" most of the O&M work to field PWCs, PWDs and ROICCs. As stated in a
NAVFAC report:
At one time the tvpical ROICCs onlv role was to administer construction
contracts which had been awarded by, the 'EI D. One procurement clerk (1100)
was normally the onlv "contract expertise" needed. Policy chanees in recent years
have resulted in more complex contracting requirements and more diversified
areas. I he tvpical ROICC Ollice now is also an OICC and is involved withClltll^ lilt INLMlil 1WIVA. VyilH-t UVJV\ 13 i!I>VJ 1111 Ul\ V, ll I IV1 13 IIIVUP1.U W lli
awarding Title II. facilities support, A,F, and new construction within its local
authority. Accordingly, the role of the LI I) has changed from principally
execution to that of providing substantial oversight to subordinate contracting
inits. [Ref. 27: p. 3]un
In short, EFD overall mission responsibilities today may be the same as in 1979,
but the way they are carried out has changed significantly, along with changes in LID
organization. Consider that in FY 79 one labor hour of EFD Program IV effort yielded
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S500 in WIP, while in FY 86 one labor hour of effort resulted in S375 WIP (constant
FY 79 S). 14 The question to be addressed in this section is: How valid is NAVFAC's
POM-level staffing model, developed in 1980, and having undergone no updates since,
for use in 1987 and beyond? This question will be partially answered by recreating the
statistical analyses done in 1979 to obtain weighted WIP factors, and by using FY 85
and FY 86 data from the four CONUS EFDs.
B. METHODOLOGY
This section traces the methodology NAVFAC used in deriving weighted WIP
factors from the three parameters of active contracts, active contract workdays, and
active projects. Data from FY 85 and FY 86 are used here to derive updated weighted
WIP factors. These will be compared to those derived in 1980 using FY 79 data.
Sources for FY' 85 and FY 86 data included NAVFAC's Integrated Program
Management System (IPMS) and Construction Management System (CMS) data
bases. Three computer programs were written to access specific information from these
data bases. The first provided Programs IV and IX labor hours and labor costs broken
down by three-character cost-account code and by work-center (02, 04, 05, etc.).
Figure 4.1 shows the construction-program cost accounts. The next program yielded,
by WIP fund group for each EFD, the number of active contracts during the fiscal
year and number of active contract days. The final program provided WIP by fund
source for each EFD.
To derive weighted WIP factors a three step process was followed:
1. Labor hours were divided into five categories: (1) 05 field construction
management and inspection hours; (2) 02 field-contract service costs; (3) 05
headquarters costs; (4) 02 headquarters costs; and (5) 09A2/09A1 50
headquarters costs.
2. These hours were related to fund source using the parameters of number of
active contracts and contract workdavs. The actual process is too lengthy to
describe here. Reference 23 pages 8- 13 'outlines the process.
3. Total WIP per fund source was divided bv total man-hours per fund source to
obtain weighted WIP factors. Tables 11-T6 summarize these results in tabular
form.
Note that the parameters in Table 1 1 are divided into two percentage columns: a
total percentage column, which represents the percentage of active contracts or active
days for a particular fund source based on all eight WIP categories, and a non-
MiLCON percentage column, which represents the percentage of that fund source
based onlv on non-MILCON fund sources. This was done because while the cost
14 Source: NAVFAC CMS and IPMS data bases
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4BE - Construction tfgmt
4BF - Project Mgmt (Design)
4BG - Contract Services; (Design)
4BX - Contractor Purchased
4BY - Government Purenased
4C - SPECIALIZED ACQUISITION SUPPORT
4CA - Collateral Equipment
4CB - Ocean Facil i ties
4CC - Crane Support
4CD - Comm/Elec Proj Mgmt
4CX - Contractor Purchased
4CY - Government Purchased
4D - PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
_.
4DA - Program Management
4D8 - Tra ining
4DC - AIS
4C - SPECIALIZED ACQUISITION SUPPORT
4CA - Collateral Equipment
4CB - Ocean Facil i ties
4CC - Crane Support
4CD - Comm/Elec Proj Mgmt
4CX - Contractor Purchased
4CY - Government Purchased
4D - PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
4DA - Program Management
4TJB - Training
4DC - AIS
TOTAL - 23 TOTAL - 27
Figure 4.1 NAVFAC Cost Account Codes
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account codes delineate between .VIILCON and non-MILCON fund sources for most
cost accounts, they do not for the Program Management cost account. Thus, the
percentage total column was used to allocate resources from this cost account to all
WTP fund sources.
TABLE 11

















MILCON 1786 5 248. 4 9. 3
NIF 5881 16. 3 17. 1 503. 9 18. 8 21
FH 1625 4. 5 4. 7 90. 3. 3 4.
ODC 1194 3. 3 3. 4 93. 1 3. 5 4. 1
RIM 405 1. 1 1. 2 44. 2 1. 7 2.
RPM 16189 44. 8 47. 2 932. 4 34. 8 38.
FAC 0% 5419 15 15. 8 439. 4 16. 4 18.
FAC 3% 3642 10 10. 6 327. 8 12. 2 13.
Source: NAVFAC IPMS and CMS data b ases
See pages 66-67 for explanation of fund source
In Table 13 the FAC 0% workload factor (WLF) was selected as the base in the
development of the other WL equivalent factors or weighted WIP factors. Analysis
indicates one man-hour generates different workload factor values by different
appropriation groups, i. e., one man-hour in FAC 0% efforts produces S393.80 of FAC
0% WIP, while one man-hour in MILCON efforts generates S571.S0 in WIP. To
reflect the disparities, the FAC 0% workload factor was selected as the base and the
others were weighted against it. These values are shown in column D.
1. Development of Staffing Standard Equation
In developing WL equivalent factors in 1980 NAVFAC used only the labor
hour data for codes 05, 02, and the Project Management Division. NAVFAC then
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TABLE 12
FY 85/86 EFD WIP BY 1-UND SOURCE (CONSTANT FY 79 S, MIL)
Engineering Fie Id Division
Fund Source ND CD SD WD
RPM 70. 9 42. 4 142 205
NIF 75. 5 35. 3 16. 8 61
FH 27. 3 11. 6 11. 7 135
ODC 32. 5 18. 5 18. 3 31. 3
RIM 19. 4 15. 6 10. 65
MILCON 134 94 250 438
FAC 0% 26. 7 21. 7 63. 3 69. 8
FAC 3% 36. 9 21. 8 5. 8 56. 8
Tot 423 260. 9 517 1061
Source: FACSO
developed a regression equation using NAVFAC's total weighted WIP per month for
FY 79 (excluding OICC Trident) as the independent variable value and the total
Acquisition Organization labor hours per month (including code 04) as the dependent
variable value. The equation derived was:
Y = (a( 11.695) + 7.577(X/12)}/145.136 (eqn4.1)
• Y = Total Work-years required
• a = Number of EFDs in equation, i.e.. for four EFDs, a = 4. for one EFD a
• X = Total weighted WIP for EFDs, in thousands
X in equation 4.1 can also be expressed as follows:
l.OXj + .91 1X 2 + .321X 3 + -305X4 + .182X 5 + .138X6 + .131X ? + .070X8
• Xj = Total RPM WIP, in thousands
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TABLE 13

























MILCON 1,600 915 571. 8 . 688
NIF 460 188. 7 409. 8 . 96
FH 120. 3 185. 8 1544 . 25
ODC 96. 3 100 1038 . 38
RPM 1,145 460. 1 401. 8 . 98
RIM 42. 3 109 2578 . 15
FAC 0% 460. 6 181. 4 393. 8 1.
FAC 3% 339. 3 135 397. 9 . 99
Source: NAVFAC CMS and IPMS d ata bases
WIP is total of FY 85
constant FY 79 $, mil
and FY 86 for CONUS EFDs /
X-> = Total NTF WIP, in thousands
Xi = Total Family Housing (FH) WIP, in thousands
X4 = Total Other Direct Cost (ODC) WIP, in thousands
X5 = Total Reimbursable (RIM) WIP, in thousands
X6 = Total MILCON WIP, in thousands
X 7 = Total Facility Support Contract 0% (FAC 0%) WIP, in thousands
X
8
= Total Facility Support Contract 3% (FAC 3%) WIP, in thousands
The equation developed using updated data is:
Y = (220,289 4- 3.2SX);(1741) (eqn 4.2)
Y = Total work-years required for the four CONUS EFDs
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TABLE 14
FY 85,86 COXUS EFD WEIGHTED WIP BY FUND SOURCE









FAC 0% 26. 7
FAC 3% 36. 4
CD SD WD
40. 7 136 197
33. 9 16. 1 58. 5
2. 9 2. 9 33. 8
7. 6. 9 11. 9
2. 3 1. 5 9. 8
64. 7 172 301
21. 7 63. 3 69. 8
21. 4 5. 7 56. 2
Tot 317 194.7 404 738
Total Labor Hours
1.368K 853. 4K 1,416K 2,664K
Weighted WIP per Labor Hour ($/hr)
231.8 228.2 285.2 277
Source: NAVFAC CMS data base
WIP in constant FY 79 $, mil. multiplied by WL
equivalent factor of column D Table 13.
• X= Total weighted WIP, in thousands
X in equation 4.2 can also be expressed as follows:
0.9SXJ + .96X2 + .25X 3 + .38X4 +• A5X5 + .6S8X6 + 1.0X ? + .99X,




















MILCON 1479 571. 8 . 138 . 688
NIF 249 409. 8 . 911 . 96
FH 500 1544 . 321 . 25
ODC 541 1038 . 305 . 38
RIM 1687 2578 . 182 . 15
RPM 210 401. 8 1. . 98
FAC 0% 1290 393. 8 . 131 1.
FAC 3% 4017 397. 8 . 070 . 99
Source: NAVFAC CMS and IPMS data b ase
TABLE 16
EFD PROGRAMS IX & IV LABOR COST COMPARISON





Source: NAVFAC CMS and IPMS data bases
Of importance in this thesis is the difference in the coefficients or weighted
values for each of the fund-source variables, between NAVFAC's equation using FY
79 data and the equation developed in this thesis (4.2) using FY 85 and FY 86 data.
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2. Assumptions
In developing Tables 11-16 several key assumptions were made. They are
described together with the rationale as to why the assumption was made.
• WIP includes EFD WIP onlv. Excluded was WIP from PVVC Great Lakes.
P\\ C San Dieeo. and PWC Pensacola. This is in accordance with NAVFAC
original methodology.
• Excluded from EFD Program IV labor hours are CHESDIV's Ocean
Engineering Function. ROICC PAC at YVESTDIV, and NORTHDIV's Weight
Handling Group. Rationale is same as (1) above.
• Included in WESTDIV's labor hour totals are the OICC Navy Regional
Medical Center, OICC Travis AFB, and the Pacific Northwest' branch in
Washington. These organizations were included because thev were considered
an extension of WESTDIV's Acquisition Organization and their WIP was
included in WESTDIV's total.
• Information on active projects was not available. Thus, to distribute the Project
Manager's labor hours among fund sources the parameter of active contracts
was used. Interviews with NAVFAC personnel indicated that, within reasonable
accuracv. active contracts was an acceptable substitute for active projects. Anv
errors were not considered significant because the Project Managers contributed
less than 10% to the labor hour total for all EFDs.
C. INTERPRETATION OF DATA
Attention should be focused on Table 15 which compares WLF and WL
equivalent factors developed by NAVFAC using FY 79 data and factors developed in
this thesis using FY 85 and FY 86 data. There are significant differences, notably in the
WL equivalent factors for MILCON, FAC 0%, and FAC 3%. This is not surprising.
In FY 79 Facility Support Contracts were in the beginning of a transition stage, both
in the volume of work represented by these type contracts, as well as the
implementation procedures. Since FY 79 the percentage of overall WIP represented by
these contracts has nearly doubled. Administration of these contracts has undergone
significant changes to the extent that at each of the Public Works Centers an entire
department is devoted to administration of these contracts. As recently as four years
ago none of these departments existed.
The fact that the MILCON WL equivalent factor significantly changed was also
not unanticipated. Consider that there has been a tremendous increase in 02 Division
staffing since FY 79. This Division devotes most of its work to the MILCON area.
Additionally, increased ROICC responsibilities in the areas of inspection and contracts
administration have led to an increase in labor hours devoted to MILCON projects.
Before proceeding further it must be noted that WL equivalent factors (or
weighted WIP factors) developed in this thesis are not considered to be exact factors
because of assumptions made and interpretations of data. Similarly, the regression
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equation developed in this thesis for forecasting manpower requirements is not
intended for ultimate use by NAVFAC. It is presented here simply to show that
facilities acquisition has greatly changed since 1979, one year's data is not entirely
representative of the entire process, and these changes are manifested in the changed
manpower staffing factors. Further perusal of Table 16 reveals that every workload
factor has changed since 1979, some increasing and some decreasing. Does this, then,
invalidate NAVFAC's staffing-standard equation developed in 19S0? Incredibly, and
fortunately, no. Table 17 reveals why. This table shows the WIP composition by fund
source for all NAVFAC EFDs from FY 79 to FY 86. Quite simply, fluctuations in
WIP composition percentage have coincided with offsetting changes in the workload
factors resulting in nearly a zero overall net change, meaning that NAVFAC's FY 79
staffing equation is still valid—so far. To validate this conclusion WIP for FY 85 - FY
86, using NAVFAC's original weighting factors, was inserted in NAVFAC's staffing-
standard equation to determine how many work-years the EFDs should have used to
accomplish that WIP, based on NAVFAC's equation. The results were that
NAVFAC's equation predicted within 15% the number of work-years actually used.
TABLE 17




80 81 82 83 84 85 86
MILCON 43% 45% 32.4% 32% 40% 41% 42. 7% 38. 1%
FH 9. 3 8. 8 8. 7. 8 4. 5 7. 8. 4 8. 1
NIF 7.8 8. 9 9. 3 8. 7 8. 4 7.2 6. 7 9. 1
RIM 12.3 9. 7 11. 3 11. 6 6. 7 4. 6 4. 2 5. 2
RPM 16.2 17. 5 21. 5 20. 3 21. 21. 5 20. 8 20.
FAC 0% 4. 4 3. 5 4. 7 5 5. 4 5. 3 4. 6 6. 1
FAC 3% 3.5 4. 3 7. 7. 1 7. 3 8. 3 8. 1 7. 8
Source: FACSO
Note: There may be some r ounding error
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The skeptical reader might say two things of this result. Firstly, to predict within
only 15° o of actual manpower resources used does not imply good accuracy of a
staffing equation. Secondly, the reader might exclaim, "Of course NAVFAC's equation
predicts work-years used-it was this equation that was used to determine the number
of work-years NAVFAC would be allocated from the POVI process to begin with!"
Addressing the first statement. Any student of the Federal Budget process is well
aware that what is asked for in the budget and what is actually received from Congress
are not usually one and the same. So it is with manpower resources. Thus the 15%
difference between staffing-standard projected manpower requirements and those
actually used fairly well tells the tale of the budget process.
Of the second statement, it is not entirely an accurate one. NAVFAC was
allocated work-year resources based on projected WIP. If NAVFAC was not receiving
enough resources,then this shortfall would be reflected in the amount of WIP it could
produce. In fact. NAVFAC is producing WIP at a volume commensurate with the
work-years allocated from its 19S0 staffing-standard equation. Of course, if there were
some overall indicator of quality, it might be shown that the quality of facilities
acquisition had declined and thus more personnel were needed to improve quality. As
no such indicator exists, this argument cannot be supported.
1. The Need for Updated Weighted WIP Factors
The apparent fact that NAVFAC's 19S0 staffing standard-equation is still
valid does not mean there is any less of a need to provide an updated version.
Workload projected is for an increase in MILCON as the Strategic Momeporting
Program gets final approval from Congress and for an increase in Facility Support
Contracts as the Commercial Activities Program gains further acceptance. These are
the very WIP categories that have undervalued workload factor coefficients. Thus,
under NAVFAC's current staffing system there could be a shortfall of manpower
resources to handle NAVFAC's "true" workload. Revised workload factor equivalent
coefficients are needed to more accurately portray NAVFAC's manpower
requirements.
D. RESOURCE ALLOCATION TO THE EFDS
To allocate manpower resources to the EFDs NAVFAC uses, as its primary
base, the SHORSTAMPS staffing-standard equation. This section will evaluate the
validity of using the SHORSTAMPS model in view of the numerous complexities of
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the stalling process outlined in Chapter II, as well as the results of the previous section
of this chapter.
Before proceeding, some statistical insights will be provided. Manipulating the
statistics of Table 14 shows that NORTHDIV used 4.31 labor hours for each S1000
WIP, CHESDIV 4.3S labor hours for each S1000 WIP, and SOUTHDIV and
WESTDIV 3.5 and 3.6 respectively, or nearly a 20% difference. In view of the new
Managing to Payroll program, Table 16 is particularly revealing. Per labor dollar,
SOUTHDIV and WESTDIV were able to place significantly more WIP than
NORTHDIV and CHESDIV.
Chapter II raised the point that statistical analysis enables judgment to focus on
that aspect of a problem that should be reserved for judgment. In view of the
numerous complexities affecting manpower staffing, what percentage of an EFD's
requirements can be determined by NAVFAC's staffing model and what percentage
must be reserved for judgment by the NAVFAC CAB and Program Managers? Before
proceeding with this analysis, an interesting note must be mentioned. Every EFD
Program manager interviewed indicated he was short in manpower resources. By how
much they could not precisely say, but they were short. Interviews with XAVFAC
Budget Analysts, however, revealed their thinking was that some of the EFDs were
overstaffed. Certainly an interesting dilemma.
The Logistics Management Institute ( L VI I), under contract to the Army Corps
of Engineers (ACE), sought to tackle the question of to what degree is a staffing
equation alone an adequate predictor of resource requirements for the ACE District
Organizations? For ACE Districts any staffing complexities would be more pronounced
than for NAVFAC's EFDs because there are more than 25 ACE Districts worldwide.
In the case of NAVFAC's six EFDs, complexities would tend to be "smoothed out"
simply because of the sheer size of each EFD. ACE District organizations vary
distinctly in size, geographical areas served, visibility of projects, etc. LMI
demonstrated that their newly developed staffing equation alone was an accurate
predictor of 80% of each District's manpower requirements. ACE then convened a
workshop in which representatives from every* District were provided the forum to
voice every factor they felt made their District unique and thus deserving of special
consideration in the staffing process. These factors totaled more than 50. Then, using
Decision Support software, ACE narrowed these factors (which included workload in
terms of WIP), to less than ten, and each factor was weighted with respect to its
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influence on stalling. As stated in Chapter II, LMI is attempting to quantify important
stalling complexities in order to develop a single equation or stalling model to forecast
as close to 100% of District stalling requirements as possible. The purpose of the ACL
workshop was to focus on the most important factors on which to collect data.
[Rcf. 25]
The results of this workshop, of importance to this thesis, are that the District
representatives confirmed through an interactive problem-solving process that workload
alone accounts for approximately 80% of stalling requirements, essentially validating
LMI's initial statistical analysis. The factors determined to most influence the
remaining 20% of stalling requirements included geographic considerations such as
CONUS or OCONUS location, number and dispersion of field offices, visibility of
projects and of areas served, stability of projects (discussed in Chapter II, section C.3),
and personnel turnover. These are virtually the same factors determined from
interviews with NAVFAC EFD personnel. [Ref. 25]
1. Validity of SHORSTAMPS Model in Staffing EFDs
As shown earlier in this chapter, the SHORSTAMPS model needs
improvement to accurately portray workload-equivalent factors for MILCON and
Facility Support contracts. Given that a stalling equation predicts approximately 80%
of manpower requirements (if not more for the EFDs), these differences in WL
equivalent factor values could cause a shortfall in manpower stalling given a particular
mixture of WIP fund types. Referring to Table 18, for FY 85 and FY 80, SOUTIIDIV
and WESTDIV, which had the lowest work-year to WIP ratios, also had the highest
volume of MILCON and Facility Support WIP.
An interesting exercise is performed in Table 19 which shows man hour
resources for FY 85; 86 redistributed among EFDs under the updated stalling equation
presented in this thesis. As shown, SOUTFIDIV would gain more resources while
weighted WIP-to-man-hour ratios converge closer than by using the existing
SHORSTAMPS equation.
Several explanations account for the remaining differences of WIP-to-man-
hour ratios. The experience level of the personnel at SOUTIIDIV, an aspect repeatedly
emphasized in interviews, may well account for that EFD being able to accomplish
greater WIP with fewer personnel resources than CIIESDIV and NORTH DIV.
CIIESDIV, which has the smallest EFD (less economy of scale than the other EFDs),
the highest visibility of projects (requiring more personnel to administer), as well as a
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TABLE 18
PERCENTAGE WIP B\ ' FUND SOURCE BY EFD
Engineering Field Division






85 86 85 86
RPM 18 15. 6 15. 5 16. 9 23. 3 29. 8 19 19. 4
NIF 16. 4 19 13. 8 13 3. 5 2. 8 6 5. 5
FH 8. 1 4. 8 7. 1. 9 2. 7 1. 7 14 11. 8
ODC 6. 2 9. 1 1. 12. 9 4. 2 2. 8 2 3. 5
RIM 4. 5 4. 5 7. 8 4. 2 1. 2. 3 9 3. 1
MILCON 32 31 40. 8 30. 9 50. 44. 8 38 45. 5
FAC 0% 7. 5. 6 7. 8 8. 7 12. 6 11. 4 7 5. 9
FAC 3% 7. 4 10 6. 6 9. 9 2. 4 4. 1 6 4. 9
Source: CMS
Note: There may be some rounding error
higher personnel turnover rate than SOUTHDIV or NORTHDIV, requires more
personnel per WTP than any other EFD, and these may well be the explaining factors.
The question then arises as to why WESTDIV is able to accomplish more WIP per
labor hour, or is required to accomplish more WIP per labor hour. This is, essentially,
the same question that prompted this thesis and was depicted, in a slightly different
form, in Table 1. Now, however, it is seen that the anomaly depicted in Table 1 is, in
reality, not nearly as pronounced. In fact, using NAVFAC weighted WIP factors,
NORTHDIV and SOUTHDIV for FY 85 86 had a combined work-year-to-weighted
WIP ratio of 4.05 while WESTDIV's was 3.82. Using updated weighted WIP factors,
this ratio was 2.22 for NORTHDIV and SOUTHDIV and 2.08 for WESTDIV. Thus,
the 20% differential depicted in Table 1 is, more realistically, a 6% difference.
However, given the strong influences on WESTDIV of such factors as high personnel
turnover rate, dispersion of offices, potential diseconomy of scale, and demographics of
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TABLE 19







Actual 1,376.7 853.4 1,416.2 2,664. 4
Redist. 1,260 858 1,545 2,640










226.7 261.5 279. 5
areas served, this six percent differential in relative staffing level in "favor" of
WESTDIV should possibly be reversed.
The summary of this subsection is that NAVFAC's SHORSTAMPS staffing-
standard equation in not nearly as accurate as a stand-alone method of allocating
resources among EFDs as it is in determining NAVFAC-wide requirments. The
percentage of WIP by fund source varies from EFD to EFD and this influences EFD
staffing requirements. Updating the weighted WIP factors is probably more important
for allocating resources among EFDs than for determining NAVFAC's requirements as
a whole.
2. Influences of "Complexities" on EFD Staffing
The previous subsection briefly discussed the factors other than workload that
have the greatest effect on EFD staffing. Several of these factors may explain why
CHESDIV has a lower WIP/WY ratio than any other EFD and why SOUTHDIV has
the highest. Of those primary influences identified during the ACE workshop,
CONUS, OCONUS locations are not a consideration in this thesis and project stability
was described in Chapter II as an occurrence that may equally effect each EFD. As
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statistics on stability were not available for each EFD, this influence is difficult to
quantify. Of the other major factors such as "visibility," economy of scale, dispersion ol'
field offices, turnover of personnel, etc., each liR) could claim one or more of these
factors as unique. Resources were simply not available for this author to further
investigate and attempt to quantify the effect of these factors on each EFD's staffing
requirements. Chapter II section D.l does describe these factors and suggests their
general effects on stalling. However, this observation \>ill be made. Interviews with
senior NAVFAC personnel generally indicated that they were not completely aware of,
or not using as the basis of judgment, many of the factors outlined in Chapter II. A
recommendation in this area will be presented in the concluding chapter.
E. ALLOCATING RESOURCES AMONG DIVISIONS
Interviews with EFD Division Directors on stalling methods yielded both
encouraging and disappointing results. One Division Director stated that he had no
idea how personnel resources were allocated to his Division. Consider the following
excerpt from the report "Organization and Stalling of NAVFACENGCOM
Contracting Offices:"
Third, the supervisors in the 02 orcanization arc almost always so caught up in
the crush of dailv business that they defer, or fail to address altogether, the
desired stalling arid skill levels needed' to do a truly adequate job. ("When you're
fighting off alligators, you forget that your oricmal goal was to drain the
swamp.") What "actuallv" happens is that'the tvpical 02" operates with a given
stalling level indefinitclv until the workload increases to an intolerable volume, at
which "time the 02 goes to the 09A and pleads for another bodv or two.
[Ref. 27: p. 5]
The intent of this section is not to precisely define methods for each EFD
Acquisition Organization Division to determine its manpower requirements. General
methods were outlined in Chapter III, and specific methods are really potential
subjects for future theses. However, it is recognized that the task confronting the head
of an EFD Acquisition Organization is not an easy one when making decisions on
allocating resources among his Divisions. Therefore, some guidance will be provided
here.
A major theme of Division-level budgeting is that it tends to be incremental.
Previous years' Division staffing levels will more than likely not be reduced. Consider
that the overall trend in Acquisition Organization staffing has been an increase every
year for the past six years (the length of time covered in this research). Therefore, in
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allocating these incremental resources it is generally a matter of assessing incremental
increases in Divisional workload. Nothing fancy. Just a general projection of" how
much more workload will he done this year than was done last year. If Division X is
projecting a 10% increase in workload and Division Y only a 2% increase, then the job
of the Acquisition Organization Head in allocating those incremental resources is made
that much easier. Unfortunately, most Division Directors interviewed did not completely
recognize this situation.
NORTHERN Division had the most unique and innovative means of
determining staffing levels for their 05 Division ROICC offices. Their system will
briefly be described here primarily as an example of the concept of using an increase in
relative workload to determine resource allocation.
NORTHDIV divided its field (ROICC) office workload into two primary
categories: procurement efforts dealing with the contracts administration workload, and
administration effort dealing with construction management. For each ROICC? office
points were given for total procurement effort based on numbers and types of contracts
awarded, and administration effort based on numbers and sizes (dollar values) of active
construction contracts. Points were then totaled for each office. The "best'' office was
then selected for use as the benchmark office. This office was judged the most properly
staffed for its workload by the EFD headquarters staff All other offices were then
staffed based on their total points compared to the benchmark office. For example, if
the benchmark office had 100 workload effort points and was staffed with 10 people,
then if another office was projecting 150 workload points they would be staffed with 15
people. Similarly, relative changes in Divisional workload could easily be translated
into changes in manpower requirements. For example, workload effort points summed
for the entire division projected for the upcoming year could be compared to those for
the previous year, and thus justification would exist for incremental staffing changes.
The system is simple, but it enables management to make informed decisions on
manpower staffing. [Ref. 2S]
The quote at the beginning of this chapter by Albert Einstein highlights the
manpower budgeting process at the Divisional level. As described in Chapter III,




This chapter has addressed the significant aspects oi~ NAVFAC's three tiered
manpower demand forecasting system. The POM-level system is ideal in methodology.
However, the need for updating the weighted WIP coefficients must be recognized.
The same SHORSTAMPS staffing model can be accurately used in allocating
resources among EFDs. Judgment on the part of XAVFAC Program managers in
interpreting outside staffing factors plays an important role in supplementing statistical
analysis for allocating resources among the EFDs. Improved accuracy of the
SFIORSTAMPS model is possible by using more recent data. Similarly, Program
managers must keep abreast of the outside factors that influence staffing in order to
make accurate judgments.
At the Division level the simplest means of expressing relative changes in
workload is the best management tool available to facilitate manpower forecasting.
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS OF FURTHER
STUDY
This thesis has sought to both portray the importance of manpower demand
forecasting for the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and the difficulties and
complicating factors affecting the determination of staffing requirements, as well as to
provide methods by which forecasts can be made. Three primary conclusions are
presented as a result of this research.
Firstly, the method by which NAVFAC forecasts staffing requirements at the
POM level is considered valid. However, because a data base of only one year was used
for developing the staffing model, the accuracy of the model can be improved by using
more recent data over a period of several fiscal years. In this thesis, analysis has shown
that at least three of the regression coefficients in the SHORSTAMPS model have
changed significantly since the model's development.
At the second tier of NAVFAC 's manpower budgeting system-allocation of
resources among the EFDs-research by the Army Corps of Engineers has shown that
a staffing-standard equation or model can be used to forecast approximately 80% of an
EFD's requirements. The remaining staffing requirements are influenced by factors that
are difficult to quantify and are best left for judgment decisions. These factors were
described in detail in Chapter II. NAVFAC's SHORSTAMPS staffing-standard model.
used with relative accuracy at the POM level, is subject to greater distortion at the
EFD level because of differences in mixtures of WIP fund sources among the EFDs.
The NAVFAC model still has a high degree of accuracy, but given the occurrence of
particular changes in WIP-fund-source-mixtures, understaffing in relation to "true"
workload could result. Updating the model's weighted WIP coefficients will result in
enhanced manpower requirements forecasting accuracy.
The general influences of outside staffing factors was addressed in this thesis.
Further research is necessary to properly weight these factors as to their effect on
staffing requirements. Research indicated that many of the factors presented in this
thesis were not adequately considered when resources were allocated among EFDs.
because their effects, or their existence, were not known. It is recommended that
NAVFAC convene a workshop similar to that done by ACE to specifically address and
weight these factors. Given that there are only six EFDs, the scale of the workshop
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need be much smaller than that of the ACE workshop, which was attended by more
thatn 25 District Officers.
This thesis also addressed the anomaly presented in Table 1 which apparently
showed that WESTDIV was having to accomplish more WIP than NORTHDIV and
SOLTHDIV combined, with 20% fewer personnel resources. In "real" terms this thesis
shows there is only a five percent difference in staffing between the EFDs, thus allaying
any major concerns about the adequacy of NAVFAC's manpower staffing system.
At the third tier of the budgeting system research indicated that methods by
which an EFD Commander can base his decision to allocate resources among his
Acquisition Organization Divisions can be improved. One such method was presented
in this thesis. This is an area in which further research, specifically directed at
determining staffing requirements for a single Division such as 04 or 02, could make an
important contribution to NAVFAC management. The Contracts Division in
particular lends itself to development of a staffing standard that could easily be used
NAVFAC-wide. Research in the form of a thesis could perform an Efficiency Review
and then develop a staffing-standard by performing a time study for each major
element of workload.
Finally, a thesis might study the costs of understaffing. Chapter II addressed the
absence of generally accepted indicators of quality and its effect on staffing. A thesis
might attempt to quantify the costs of manpower shortage such as increased change
orders (only two years' data was examined in this thesis, and then for only one
Division), number of claims, polling customer satisfaction with a new facility, increased
turnover of personnel caused by over-work, or other indicators. Accurate
quantification of these costs would facilitate proper interpretation of Tables 16 and 19
and improve the staffing process.
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